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ABSTRACT
The aim of this study is to provide a structural analysis of the second house of the
South African Parliament - the National Council of Provinces (NCOP).
The study firstly focuses on the theoretical experience of second chambers in general.
It then touches on a comparative study of second chambers of selected countries. The
study then provides a description of the composition of the second house in South
Africa, the committee system employed as well as the information flow. It also
explores the concept of co-operative governance, the powers assigned to the NCOP
by the Constitution and discusses the method of selecting delegates in detail. In
addition the study focuses on the role that the NCOP is expected to play within the
national legislative process.
This analysis is descriptive in nature and aims to serve as an educational tool for the
South African public as well as in the international arena.
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OPSOMMING
Die doel van hierdie studie is om 'n strukturele analise te maak van die tweede kamer
van die Suid-Afrikaanse Parlament, die Nasionale Raad van Provinsies (NRVP).
Eerstens fokus die studie op die teoretiese ervaring van tweede kamers in geheel. Dit
gaan dan verder om sekere vergelykings te tref tussen die tweede kamers van verkose
lande. Die studie beskryf onder andere die samestelling van die tweede kamer in Suid-
Afrika, hoe die komiteestelsel gebruik word, asook die vloei van informasie binne die
NRVP. Die studie gaan ook verder om die konsep van saamwerkende regering en die
konstitusionele magte van die instelling te bespreek asook die metode om
afgevaardiges te verkies tot die NRVP. Die studie fokus ook op die verwagte rol van
die NRVP binne die nasionale wetgewende proses.
Hierdie analise is beskrywend van aard en beoog om te dien as 'n opvoedkundige
instrument vir die Suid-Afrikaanse publiek asook binne die internasionale arena.
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Chapter 1
Introduction to Second Chambers and Problem Statement
1.1 Introduction
A bicameral system is defined as a legislature which has two chambers rather than
one, providing checks and balances and lessening the risk of elective dictatorship
(Comfort, 1993: 44). Whether a legislature will consist of one or two houses is
generally determined by the constitution of that country. Historically, bicameralism
was an established characteristic of most legislatures and reflected a class-conscious
conviction that the representation of the people should be supplemented by the
representation of some sort of aristocracy (Loewenberg, 1985: 121). This conviction
was the basis of the distinction between the House of Commons and the House of
Lords in Great Britain. This distinction is also of particular importance for South
Africa because the parliament also consists of two legislative bodies.
Bicameralism, originated in the essential pre-democratic view that the representation
of the nation required both an upper and lower house, in the class-conscious sense of
"upper" and "lower". It was, however, particularly well suited to federal systems of
government, in which both the states and the people could claim the right to be
represented in the national legislature (Comfort, 1993: 45). The application of
bicameralism to the needs of a federal system was distinctly an American
intervention, even if bicameralism itself was an older idea. In the South African case
the need for a bicameral system is to ensure the participation of provincial and local
government in the national legislative process as to protect the interest of these two
spheres.
In the 1996 Constitution, South Africans chose to adopt a national Parliament
composed of two legislative bodies - the National Assembly (NA) and the National
Council of Provinces (NCOP). Together they are responsible for drafting, debating
and passing the legislation that will govern the new South Africa. The success of the
new democracy will depend greatly on how and how well, these two legislative
bodies perform their assigned roles.
1
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These roles are complementary, but not identical. The NA represents all South
African voters, as individuals. lts membership is based on proportional representation.
As the primary expression of the democratic will of the people it is, ultimately, the
more powerful of the two chambers.
The NCOP has a somewhat more limited, but also critical role. It represents South
African citizens not directly, in their role as individual citizens, but indirectly, in their
role as residents of the provinces where they reside. lts role is to represent the
provincial perspective within national Parliament. As such, it is a concrete expression
of the commitment to "co-operative government" as set out in chapter three of the
Constitution (Constitution of RSA, 1996). Co-operative government means that
governing South Africa is to be seen as a partnership among the different spheres of
government. This in tum requires that national legislation must be sensitive to
provincial needs and concerns. It also means that provinces do not act alone or in
isolation; rather they must be deeply integrated into the national legislative process.
This seems to be the underlying rationale of the NCOP (Murray, 1998: 13). This
rationale is reflected both in the powers assigned to the NCOP and the composition of
its membership. Like the NA, its fundamental job is to debate and pass legislation,
and to oversee the executive. But it does so from a distinctly provincial perspective.
Hence the powers are much greater with respect to legislation which directly affect
the provinces, and to constitutional amendments than they are in matters which do not
affect the provinces.
The NCOP is a fairly new institution. This resulted in a serious lack of academic
literature about this institution. Another contributing factor to this problem is the fact
that this institution is a unique South African product without any precedent. This
study wants to open up the mystery of the newly established second chamber of the
South African Parliament. In this chapter the background to bicameralism, the
purpose of second chambers, the role thereof as well as the history of the South
African second chamber are discussed. The chapter also elaborates on the problem
statement, purpose of the study and the research method employed in this study.
Before one could however embark on a proper discussion of any second chamber the
notion of bicameralism firstly needs to be addressed.
2
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1.2 Background to bicameralism
Parliaments are frequently classified according to the number of chambers they
possess. Those with a single chamber are termed unicameral and those with two
chambers bicameral. Most countries which have recognisable legislatures have
unicameral bodies (Shell, 1988: 1). In liberal democracies, most Parliaments are
bicameral and the minority with one-chamber legislatures are, without exception,
comparatively small in population. They include a number whose switch from
bicameralism to unicameralism has been made in the post-war era, for example, New
Zealand in 1950, Denmark in 1953, and Sweden in 1973, none of which have
populations above 10 million (Shell, 1988: 3 also see Chaney, 1988: 1). One could
therefore conclude and say that all large liberal democratic countries continue to have
bicameral legislatures, but that elsewhere bicameralism remains by no means
uncommon, especially in liberal democracies.
The underlying justifications for bicameralism have changed as prevailing ideas about
legitimate forms of government have altered. In the pre-democratic period,
parliamentary assemblies generally consisted of two chambers, because this reflected
the view that some separate representation for aristocrats, "elders" or people with
property, must be provided (Coghill, 1984: 14). As the acceptability of notions of
distinct class-based representation diminished, so the language in which second
chambers were justified tended to alter. Instead of recognising the desirability of
providing distinct representation for aristocracy and property, the need for a body to
provide some restraint upon directly elected popular chambers came to be emphasised
(Shell, 1988: 12). Although some existing states function satisfactorily with a single
chamber legislature, the presence of second chambers throughout the world is
nevertheless significant (Strong, 1972: 199).
In modem times there are two kinds of arguments for a bicameral system. Firstly,
there is the concern for a more stable balance between the executive and the
legislature. This concern resulted in the restriction of the unbridled power of a single
chamber recruited on a different basis 1. On the method of recruiting members for the
second chamber, the following variations are normally employed: the representations
I E.g. Members of the NA in South Africa are recruited from the political parties national lists. Members from the NCOP are
nominated by provincial legislatures to ensure the provincial link (Constitution of RSA S47 and S62, 1996).
3
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of regional VIews III the form of regional governments, regional legislators, and
regional electoral or particular minorities (ANC Head Quarters, 1995: 25).
Secondly, as a method of ensuring that the parliamentary machinery runs more
effectively and smoothly, the second house then play the so-called "revising role" to
maintain a careful check on the sometimes hasty decisions of a first chamber (Hirsch
and Hanoch, 1979: 35). The second chamber of the South African Parliament
combines its functions with the role of facilitating intergovernmental co-operation, as
is the case in Germany and Austria (South African Parliament, 1996: 35).
1.3 Purpose of a second chamber
Ranney (1975: 358) argues that, historically, there are two arguments for the existence
of a second chamber. Firstly, democracies in federal states regard it necessary for
their sub-national units (states/provinces) to have equal representation in the national
legislature and, secondly, both unitary and federal states feel the need to provide for
internal control in respect of legislative action (See Levrnore, 1992: 45).
Regarding the first argument for existence, Strong notes that such an institution can
give priority to the will of each of the units in a federation as against the interests of
the federation as a whole (Strong, 1972: 178). Wheare believes that members of
second chambers can represent interests and views that could be ignored or
subordinated, particularly in respect of rural versus urban interests (Wheare, 1963:
213). In this regard, states that are less populated, for example, have equal
representation in a second chamber. According to a report by the South African Law
Commission on Constitutional Models a single chamber system cannot accommodate
heterogeneous interests and could therefore lead in practice to majority domination
(South African Law Commission, 1991: 828)_2Riggs, on the other hand, believes that
there can be single chamber legislatures in which minority rights can be well
protected, if there is unlimited debating or if a diversity of interests are present (Riggs
in Kornberg, 1973: 53).
2 This was exactly the two points of concern during the negotiations in South Africa (1991-1993) regarding the establishment ofa
second house. South Africa is a country that is deeply divided along racial lines. It was felt that a second house would not only
allow for the refining of legislation but that it would ensure that issues like views and interests of minorities that easily could get
lost in a one chamber system would be adhered to in a two-chamber system. This view was shared amongst some ANC members
(Interview: Mr N. Ackerman National Party negotiator during constitution - making process and presently a NCOP delegate for
the Western Cape, 8 June 2000).
4
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The ability of second chambers to protect other interests, specifically minority
interests, in heterogeneous societies has to be qualified. Although it is possible, in
principle, to protect the interests of minorities through the operation of two chambers
(of which the legislative assembly in Belgium is an example in respect of language
interests), it is a prerequisite, according to De Villiers (1994: 129), that there be a
general consensus between different political groups in a society on the question of
whether minorities are entitled in principle, to protection. A culture of tolerance
regarding the recognition and protection of minorities therefore has to exist. If such a
culture does not exist and if the rest of the population is unwilling to do so, a
constitution will not be able to protect a particular minority.
The South African Law Commission Report on Constitutional Models further
identifies two principles that have to be considered in determining the role and
function of a second chamber, firstly the democratic principle that all citizens are
equal, and that a deviation from majority rule therefore amounts to a deviation from
this principle (South African Law Commission, 1991: 831). The second principle is
that there should be a justified need for the protection of certain interests, such as
minorities. The role and function of a second chamber is therefore determined by
finding a balance between these two principles, with consideration of the points of
view and values prevalent in a society. In the South African context, this would mean
that the protection of specific interests in a second chamber would have to take place
with consideration and favouring of certain groups. South Africa is a country
composed of various cultural groups and to make one group's values prevalent in
society would imply a certain degree of cultural domination.
In terms of the second argument for the existence of a second chamber and which
relates to internal control in respect of legislative action, Strong shows that this
prevents incorrect or flawed legislation in respect of the Constitution and other
legislation from being passed by a single chamber (Strong, 1972: 178). It also means
that the first chamber does not have unchecked power that could threaten the freedom
of individuals and minorities. Wheare argues in this regard that the value of a second
chamber lies in the fact that it provides a second opinion (Wheare, 1963: 211). The
value of even simply delaying a matter lies in providing an opportunity for mustering
support for a particular matter, which could result in the government or first chamber
5
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having to make amendments or to reconsider the matter. If this does not succeed,
sufficient time has nonetheless passed to draw the attention of the public to the matter.
1.4 The role of second chambers
It has long been recognised that checks and balances are necessary in a system of
government to ensure that individual power is not abused. A parliament to which the
executive is responsible for its actions is one such check (Dayer, 1959: 100-145).
Parliament is the law-making assembly where the opinions, interests and beliefs of the
people are represented. It is the foundation upon which modem democracy is built
and it is thus the role of Parliament to ensure that the government is answerable to the
governed (Hirsch and Hanoch, 1979: 72-97).
Normally a second house will fulfil its role as a check on government by scrutinising
bills, delegated legislation, government administration and government policy, but
generally restraints are imposed on the second chamber with regard to money bills.
Normally these bills cannot be introduced in the second chamber and the second
house will only have a short substantial veto on such bills (Hirsch and Hanoch, 1979:
72-97). Where there is a separation of powers, the second chamber has usually been
given equal powers with the first chamber. There is usually provision for differences
between the two houses to be resolved by a mediation committee, but for breaking
deadlocks a number of different arrangements have been employed. InGermany, bills
relating to matters within exclusive federal jurisdiction and in Malaysia for most bills,
the second chamber has only a substantial veto (Hirsch and Hanoch, 1979: 72-116,
also see Watts, 1994: 16). Historically, the South African second chamber was always
characterised by having restrictive powers. Following is a detailed discussion of the
history of the second chamber of South Africa, illustrating the various powers it had
during its existence over the years.
1.5 The history of the South African second chamber
The Republic of South Africa was a colony of Great Britain. The sovereign legislature
was therefore modelled on the Westminster Parliament. The South Africa Act of 1909
provided for a bicameral legislature, which established the Union of South Africa on
31 May 1910 (Cloete, 1996: 14). This Act provided for the Parliament of the Union of
South Africa to consist of two houses, namely the Senate and the House of Assembly.
6
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The House of Assembly was the dominant house and consisted of directly elected
representatives, but all legislation had to be passed by both houses and all money bills
had to be initiated in the House of Assembly. The members of the Cabinet were also
members of the House of Assembly. The bicameral system introduced on 31 May
1910 remained in force until 3 September 1984 (National Democratic Institute (NDl),
1996: 27).
The tricameral system created by the Republic of South Africa Constitution Act, 1983
(Act 110 of 1983), which came into force on 3 September 1983, did not provide for an
upper or a lower house. The three houses were all, indeed, lower houses with equal
powers. The House of Assembly, consisting of a hundred and seventy eight members,
represented the interest of the white citizens and had legislative powers regarding
their affairs. The House of Representatives consisted of eighty-five members and
represented the coloured citizens. They also only had legislative powers regarding
their own affairs. The House of Delegates represented the Indian interest. This house
consisted of forty-five members and had legislative powers only regarding Indian
affairs (Cloete, 1993: 26).
After the first democratic election in 1994, the Senate was re-introduced. Only a few
months after the reintroduction of a Senate in the Republic of South Africa, after an
absence of 14 years, a renewed debate on the nature and role of such an institution
was under way (Basson, 1995: 14). On 14 September 1994 (during the debate on the
President's budget vote in the Senate) President Nelson Mandela said the following
regarding the future role and function of the Senate:
" I do not for a single moment doubt the need for a Senate, with the two broad
objectives as currently defined. Firstly, the Senate is meant to represent the interests
of the provinces in the central Parliament. Secondly, it embodies the unity of South
Africa and its people. The very existence of the Senate expresses the interdependence
of the provinces. Related to this is the role of the Senate in the constitution-making
process, its right, and indeed, obligation, to initiate national legislation and to playa
crucial role in the composition of judicial bodies in general and the Constitutional
Court in particular. The Senate, therefore, symbolises the fact that South Africa is
more than just a mere collection of provinces. Members of this House have a
7
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responsibility to provinces other than their own and indeed to the nation as a whole"
(Senate Hansard, 1994: 1012, also see Sowetan 19 June 1994).
All of the newly established provinces soon argued that this institution does not allow
for the adequate representation of their interests. One explanation for their discontent
lay in the lack of a clear link between the provinces and the senate (Humphries and
Meierhenrich, 1996: 30). The senators were appointed by the political parties on a
basis of proportional representation and not by the provincial government. 3
In the bicameral system that then existed, the second house was known as the Senate.
The Senate consisted of ten permanent senators selected according to the political
strength of a party in a province (Humphries and Meierhenrich, 1996: 25). Certain
problems were experienced by the operations of the Senate. Firstly, the Senate did not
deal with matters differently than in the NA. It simply became a duplication of the NA
(Basson, 1995: 15 also see Constitutional Assembly, 1996: 37); Secondly, the Senate
failed to represent the provinces, because there was no official communication
between the provinces and the senators and the Interim Constitution also did not
provide for this. The senators were not accountable to the Provincial Legislatures.
There was no official link between the provinces and senators. With the introduction
of the final Constitution, however, the Senate was abolished and a new structure,
namely the NCOP was introduced to represent the provinces more meaningfully
(Murray, 1998: 10, also see Mpumalanga Legislature Hansard, 1996: 7).
The negotiations on the new upper house in the Constitutional Assembly were
characterised by lack of agreement between the federalists (Inkatha Freedom Party
(IFP) & New National Party (NNP)) and the centralists (African National Congress
(ANC) with regards to the power of provinces within the new structure (Humphries
and Meierhenrich, 1996: 45 also see Beeld 2 July 1996). The reasons for the disputes
derive from opposing visions of whether South Africa should become a unitary state
with federal characteristics or a federalist-type state within a single country. This
philosophical debate pits the ANC and Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), which favour
3 This resulted in the lack of a link between senators and Provincial Legislatures. Senators also were not accountable to
Provincial Legislatures. Interview: Ackerman, 8 June 2000.
8
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
the unitary option, against the IFP, NP and the DP (The Star 14 June 1996 also see
ANC Parliamentary Research Department, 1996: 23).
During a multi-party bosberaad at Arniston in 1996 all the parties, except the IFP,
committed themselves to the defence of direct representation of provincial interests at
the national legislative level (Argus 14 May 1996). The ANC-constitutional planners
had put forward a model in which provinces can legislate their own constitutions and
pass legislation within areas of provincial interests. It was argued that the notion of
the ANC's idea of a council to represent provincial interests in place of the senate was
the basis of the compromise to resolve the South African constitution-making impasse
(Argus 14 May 1996).
Negotiations on the new upper house in the Constitutional Assembly were
preoccupied with the German Bundesrat, which many saw as a desirable model for
South Africa. Senior members of the Constitutional Assembly, in fact, visited
Germany in early 1996 to gain insights into the working of the German federal system
(Humphries and Meierhenrich, 1996: 27). The NCOP is however quite distinct from
the German Bundesrat with respect to the recruitment of members as well as the
functioning of the institution (Department of Constitutional Affairs, 1997: 37).
During the negotiations around the transformation of South Africa, the tendency of a
more decentralised government were incorporated to accommodate parties such as the
IFP and the NP who had an interest to protect their federalist position against the
centralist approach of the ANC. The product of these negotiations was a political
compromise that resulted in the creation of provinces and the development of the
concept of co-operative governance (Humphries and Meierhenrich, 1996: 35). One
could conclude that the NCOP came about as a political compromise based on the
original proposal of the ANC of a council of provinces. This compromise was based
on the idea to establish a council of provinces while accommodating the more federal
characteristics" supported by the other parties such as the NP and IFP. Hence, the
South African state is characterised as a unitary state with certain federal tendencies
(Murray, 1998: 1).
4 E.g. Provinces can have their own Constitutions as long as it is in line with the country's Constitution (Constitutional
Assembly, 1996:14).
9
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South Africa has a long history with second chambers. The creation of the NeOp
once again confirmed the country's belief in the necessity of a second chamber in the
democratic process. The previous discussion illustrates that the South African second
chambers were adapted to serve the political needs of the country during specific
times. In conclusion the NeOp was created to allow provinces to be represented in
the national legislative process.
1.6 Problem statement and purpose of the study
In 1996 the NeOp replaced the Second House of the South African Parliament, the
Senate. The fact that it was established in 1996 only two years after the 1994 election,
resulted in a serious lack of information regarding its functioning. lts newness has led
to a serious lack of academic literature on it as an institution, which places a definite
and urgent obligation on scholars to explore and analyse the workings of the NeOp.
The purpose of the study is to describe the composition, functions and powers of the
NeOp as well as to describe the role that this institution plays in the national
legislative process. This is a descriptive study of the composition and working of the
South African second chamber. My aim with this study is to shed some light on the
workings of the NeOp not only for international interest and academic purposes, but
also to make a contribution to the general knowledge about the NeOp. I believe that
this study will contribute towards enhancing the political education of one of the
world's youngest democracies - South Africa.
This study does, however, not explore the political discussions with regard to the
establishnient of the NeOp in detail, because this topic calls for a study on its own.
The complexity of the negotiations requires an in depth analysis of the documentation
available as well as conducting various interviews. A different research method
should therefore be employed to discuss the political nuances of the negotiations
regarding the NeOp.
1.7 Research method employed
To analyse and capture the workings of the second house of the South African
Parliament, a qualitative research project was undertaken. The nature of this study
required the techniques and methods of qualitative research. Qualitative research has a
10
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long and distinguished history in the human disciplines. It is a field of inquiry in its
own right which cuts across disciplines, fields and subject matter. A complex
interconnected family of terms, concepts and assumptions surround the term
qualitative research. These include the traditions associated with positivism, post-
structuralism and the many qualitative research perspectives or methods connected to
cultural and interpretative studies (Bless 1995: 12).
One of the strengths of qualitative research is that data is collected in close proximity
to a specific situation. The emphasis is on a specific case, a focused and "bounded
phenomenon embedded in its own context" (Bless, 1995: 13). Another feature of
qualitative data is their richness and holism and its strong potential for revealing
complexity. According to Bless (1995: 11): "Such data provide thick descriptions that
are vividly nested in a real context, and have a ring of truth that has strong impact on
the reader". Furthermore, the fact that such data is typically collected over a sustained
period makes it useful for studying any process, and the inherent flexibility of
qualitative studies gives further confidence that we have really understood what has
been going on. Qualitative research often has been advocated as the best strategy for
discovery and exploring a new area (Nel, Singh & Venter, 1985: 34).
The data to be used for this qualitative analysis is of a secondary nature. The data was
gathered from parliamentary and departmental reports and relevant literature like
news reports and newspaper clippings. These reports and other relevant literature
were studied and analysed to provide the reader with an in depth discussion of the
workings of the NCOP. Interviews were conducted and role-playing offices were also
consulted.
1.8 Conclusion
This chapter attempted to introduce the study and strived to illustrate to the reader
what to expect in the following chapters. In chapter two the transition from the Senate
to the NCOP is discussed. A theoretical background to second chambers in general is
also provided in this chapter. Chapter three gives a full description of the structure,
committee system, method of selecting delegates and the information flow in the
NCOP. The fourth and concluding chapter focuses on challenges facing this
11
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institution and provides a list of possible recommendations for the institution to
consider.
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Chapter 2
From Senate to NCOP
2.1 Introduction
This chapter firstly gives an historical overview of the South African Senate (1994-
1996) and how it related to other second chambers regarding specific characteristics.
Secondly, it gives an evaluation of the Senate to highlight the shortcomings that led to
its abolishment and the establishment of the NCOP.
South Africa's Government of National Unity (GNU) was a constitutionally defined
multi-party government. The GNU came into existence after South Africa's first
democratic elections, in April 1994. There were seven parties represented in the South
African Parliament. See table 1 for an illustration.
Table 1: Distribution of Party Seats in the '94 Parliament
African National Congress = 252
National Party = 82
Inkatha Freedom Party = 43
Freedom Front = 9
Democratic Party = 7
Pan Africanist Congress = 5
African Christian Democratic Party = 2
(Public Education Department of Parliament, 1997: 2).
The GNU was established in terms of South Africa's Interim Constitution. This
defined political structures at almost every level for a period of five years. The two
largest parties or any party that received more than 20 % of the vote were entitled to
nominate a person to one of the vice-presidency posts. The cabinet of 27 seats
included members from all parties that received more than 10% of the vote, in
proportion to each party's support. The dispensation defined in the Interim
Constitution was meant to continue until the next elections scheduled for April 1999,
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but at the end of June 1996 the NP withdrew from the GNUs (Public Education
Department of Parliament, 1997: 3). The Constitutional Assembly (combined sittings
of the NA and the former Senate) adopted a final constitution on May 1996. The new
constitution was signed into law on 10 December 1996 (Public Education
Department of Parliament, 1997: 3 also see South African Parliamentary
Announcements and Tablings (ATC), 1997).
The legislative authority in South Africa after the elections in 1994 consisted of two
chambers, namely the NA and the Senate. The NA consisted of four hundred
members elected through the system of proportional representation. The Senate was
comprised of ninety senators (ten senators per province) who were nominated by the
parties represented in the provincial legislature on a proportional basis. No residential
qualification was, however, set in respect of a particular province at the time of or
following the nomination of a senator." The qualification for nomination as a senator
was the same as that for members of the NA (Department of Constitutional Affairs,
1994: 5).
The term of office of senators was also the same for the NA and therefore related to
elections that had to be held every five years (Constitution RSA Sections 40, 48 and
50, 1993). Since senators were nominated by political parties and not elected directly
by the electorate, party loyalty and discipline played an important part in the decision
making process in the Senate. According to Section 51 of the Constitution a senator
has to resign if he or she ceases to be a member of the party that nominated him or her
(Constitution RSA, 1993).
In terms of the powers of the Senate, Ordinary Bills may have been submitted in
either the NA or the Senate, and adoption has to be approved by both chambers of
Parliament. Bills related to revenue, the appropriation of funds or taxation was
submitted only in the NA (Constitution RSA, 1993).
5 The NP withdrew from the GNU a day after the passage of the new constitution. The reasons according to the then secretary-
general of the NP, Roelf Meyer were because the strains within government and within the NP became unendurable (Financial
Mail May 17, 1996). Meyer admitted that after 46 years of draconian rule the" NP simply didn't know how to fulfil the role of
an opposition party" (Script of Current Affairs, SABC 3 TV programme: 10 May 1996).
6 Mr Moorcraft, resident in the Eastern Cape, was nominated by the Democratic Party as senator for the Province of
KwaZulu/Natal (Department of Constitutional Affairs, 1994:6).
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Furthermore, these Bills, if rejected or amended by the Senate, were referred back to
the NA, which then had the right to approve the Bill with or without the amendment.
The Constitution could be amended only if approved by a two-thirds majority of a
Joint Sitting of the NA and the Senate - excluding the constitutional principles
(Constitution RSA, 1993). Bills that affected the boundaries of provinces or the
exercise or performance of their powers and functions needed the approval of the
Senate. Bills that amended the Constitution in respect of the boundaries of a particular
province or the exercise or performance or functions, could only have been approved
if a two-thirds majority of senators of a province or provinces voted in favour of it
(Constitution RSA, 1993). In this respect the powers of the Senate could, to a certain
extent, be regarded as a veto although it is not described as a veto in the Constitution.
In this case there was a strong provincial link in terms of the powers of senators
(South African Parliamentary Library, 1996: 16).
In the event of a dispute between the two chambers of Parliament over a draft Bill, the
matter was referred to a joint committee consisting of members of both chambers. A
Joint Sitting of the NA and the Senate was then held to consider the draft Bill and the
joint committee's recommendations. Only an ordinary majority was required to
approve the draft legislation (Constitution RSA, 1993). Since the NA had four
hundred members and the Senate only ninety, the NA was in a good position to see
that such a Bill is passed.
In respect of legislation that does not affect regional interests, the Senate did not have
strong powers; hence the Senate could not easily block a Bill approved by the NA.
According to Watts (1994: 139), the Senate has also been given a specific role
together with the NA in a number of areas for example, in the appointment and
removal of the Public Protector and the Auditor -General and the establishment of the
Commissions on Gender Equality and on Restitution of Land Rights (Constitution
RSA, 1993).
In contrast to the members of the NA, parties represented in the provincial legislature
nominated senators on a proportional basis. Party lists were therefore not used. The
Senate's political composition was proportionate to the representation of political
parties at provincial level (in the provincial legislature). Furthermore, as mentioned
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earlier, there were no qualifications as to residence. It could therefore happen that
people who were not successful in elections for the NA could be nominated as
senators (Watts, 1994: 241).
Compared to the party representation of the NA, certain parties were in a weaker
position in the Senate. The ANC for example succeeded in obtaining a two-thirds
majority in the Senate as opposed to its 62% support in the NA, whereas the NP's
support in the Senate was 18%, compared to its 20% support at national level (Watts,
1994: 236).
The position of the other parties was as follows:
Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) Nationall0%
Freedom Front (FF)
Democratic Party (DP)
National2%
Nationall%
Senate 5%
Senate 5%
Senate 3%
With the exception of the FF and the DP, other smaller parties such as the PAC and
the African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP) were worse off in the Senate than in
the NA in terms of seats. In the case of the FF and the DP, the second ballot was
probably responsible for this trend (Coetzee, 1996: 24). The electoral system used is
important to second chambers, because it determine the party representation in this
house, as illustrated above.
Before one can understand the workings of the NCOP or any second chamber it is
important to understand the general characteristics of second chambers. The different
application of each characteristic has an impact on how the chamber is ultimately
defined. In the following section it is attempted to outline the most general
characteristics and their variations.
2.2 Background to the functioning of second chambers
The nature, role, composition and functioning of second chambers are determined by
both the constitutional system and the community they are intended to serve
(Constitutional Development Services (CDS) Internal document no. 2.24, 1995: 14).
Although there are several variables that could have an effect on the nature of second
chambers, certain characteristics or principles can nevertheless be identified when
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comparing them. Such a comparison offers the opportunity to analyse and evaluate a
particular second chamber on the basis of principles. In this regard Strong points out
that it is essential for an analysis of second chambers to reflect the true nature of the
chamber in respect of matters such as the manner of appointment, powers and dealing
with disputes (Strong, 1972: 178).
In the analysis of second chambers in other states, the following characteristics were
identified. These characteristics are important because it ultimately determines the
type of second chamber that one finds in a particular country.
2.2.1 Manner of appointment/composition'
According to a study by the President's Council, the trend throughout the world is for
one chamber to consist of representatives of the society as a whole, elected by
universal franchise (President's Council, 1990: 60). Using a form of proportional
representation as a basis for election, this chamber will reflect the national support for
each party. The second chamber is generally structured in such a way that it is
representative of geographic units such as regions (in a unitary state) or member states
(in federation), ethnic groups, other interest groups such as environmentalists,
traditional leaders (tribal leaders) or senior members of the community elected on the
grounds of their expertise or experience in particular fields (Loewenberg, 1985: 216
also see Longley, 1989: 25). With regards to the manner of appointment of members
of second chambers, Strong (1972: 179) shows that the nomination of senators usually
derives from heredity, nominations, elected members or party elected members. It is
however clear from the analysis of second chambers in a number of states that a
combination of these factors can also occur. Here follows an overview of how
members are appointed and brief examples thereof.
2.2.1.1 Heredity
The British House of Lords, in whom some members hold hereditary seats, dates back
to the thirteenth century when an assembly of the nobility advised the king. The Lord
Temporal use to consist of members who are lords and ladies through heredity (about
seven hundred and eighty), members of the nobility appointed as barons or baronesses
7 The manner in which delegates to the NCO? is appointed would be discussed in chapter three.
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in terms of the Life Peerage Act 1958 and the Lords of Appeal in Ordinary (eleven
highly jurists) who become life peers in terms of legislation (CDS Internal Document
nO.1: 4, 1995: 34). This however changes at the end of the 1998-99 parliamentary
session. In accordance to section one of the House of Lords Act, six hundred and fifty
heredity peers ceased to be members of the House while, under section two, ninety
heredity peers remained members for their lifetime or until a subsequent act provides
otherwise (House of Lords 1999: 1). In Belgium a different pattern emerges where the
sons of the king or princes of that branch of the royal family that may become heirs to
the throne, among others, qualify as members of the Senate (Department of
Constitutional Affairs, 1994: 14).
2.2.1.2 Nominations
In Canada senators are nominated by the governor-general and in Malaysia nominees
make up a proportion of the senate. In Britain, part of the House of Lords is
constituted from certain archbishops and a number of senior bishops of the Church of
England who serve for as long as they retain their posts. This has changed recently.
(See discussion in 2.2.1.1.) Over and above other means of representation, elected
representatives nominate further twenty-five members of the Belgian Senate. The
Indian upper chamber includes twelve members who are nominated by the President
(The Parliamentarian July 1990: 12 also see The Parliamentarian July 1993: 34 and
October 1993: 26).
2.2.1.3 Elected members
Strong points out that if a second chamber is removed from popular control, it loses
vitality (Strong, 1972: 102). Voters in the respective federated states of Australia and
the USA elect senators by a direct ballot. Although the various cantons in Switzerland
make their own decisions on the appointment of members, the election of senators for
the State Assembly generally takes place by means of a direct ballot.
2.2.1.4 Party elected members
This category refers to cases where governments of federated states nominate senators
directly, as in the case of the Bundesrat in Germany. In other cases legislatures of
states or provinces, who are directly elected by the electorate, can in tum
nominate/elect senators, as in Malaysia, Belgium and India. According to the
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Namibian constitution, each regional council elects two members (CDS internal
document no.l: 4, 1995: 24).
2.2.1.5 Combination of nomination, direct election and partial election
As set out above, there are various combinations by which members of second
chambers are appointed. In this regard Belgium is a good example of where the
Senate is made up of four categories of people - directly elected, partly elected,
nominated and heredity (Seminar on Federal Relations, 1996: 190). The Indian upper
House and the Malaysian second chamber are constituted through nomination and the
elected members of the legislative assemblies of each state elect further members.
2.2.2 Term of office
As regards to the term of office of senators, three types of terms can be distinguished.
Here are the types;
i) The term of office of members of the upper and lower chamber differs for
example in the USA, Namibia, Australia and Germany.
In this regard the term of office of senators could be a fixed term of six years
in Namibia and Australia for example, or senators can be elected for a term of
six years staggered over two year periods as is the case in USA. In Australia,
senators change every six years except in the case of the arrangement that half
of the senators initially serve for only three years (Department of
Constitutional Affairs, 1994: 34).
ii) The term of office of senators coincides or occurs with that of members of the
Lower House for example in RSA and Malaysia.
iii) Senators in Canada appointed when the constitution first came into effect in
1867 retain their positions for life, but those appointed thereafter remain until
the age of seventy-five (Schaffer, 1990: 24).
Wheare argues that a longer term of office and partial renewal at times means that the
members of second chambers are more "conservative" in the sense that they are not
quite up to date on the latest developments. He also hold the view that a longer term
of office could give second chambers a greater degree of independence from their
party leaders, which is the case with members of first chambers (Wheare, 1963: 212).
It appears that the term of office of members of the first and second chambers differ
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from each other in most states. If the point of departure is that a second chamber is not
merely a duplication of the first chamber, it is desirable that the term of office of
members of the two chambers should differ and also result in other interests being
represented in the second chamber. Where, in addition, terms of office are staggered
as in the case of the USA, the composition of the Senate cannot only change, but
stability and continuity are also retained. The nomination of senators up to the age of
seventy-five years, in Canada (initially for life), contributes to them not really being
regarded as representatives of the people, rather as a reward for faithful service to the
respective parties. The result is that the Senate does not form a real check or balance
(Department of Constitutional Affairs, 1994: 36).
2.2.3 Qualifications and nature of the members
In some states senators have to meet certain qualifications. In states such as the USA,
Nigeria (prior to the suspension of the 1979 constitution) and Malaysia senators have
to be at least thirty years old, while residence qualifications are also set in states such
as the USA and Canada. In the case of Belgium senators have to be at least forty years
old. Other qualifications that are set include financial independence e.g. Belgium and
expertise in certain fields e.g. India and proof of exceptional service as in the case of
Malaysia. In states Namibia, Australia and Switzerland, no additional qualifications to
those applicable in the first chamber are set (Rosenthal, 1996: 27).
2.6 Interest groups or institutions that are represented
The principle of representation in a second chamber is closely related to the manner of
appointment. Due to the historic link between the population and royalty in Britain,
the House of Lords could to some extent be regarded as representative of the general
population, although the population has no direct say in the composition of the House
of Lords (The Parliamentarian October 1972: 23, also see The Parliamentarian
October 1982: 34).
Where senators are nominated, as is the case in Canada, Malaysia and Britain, there
is, of course a danger that senators could become mere lackeys of the government of
the day and not necessarily be a mouthpiece for the population. In cases such as
Australia, the USA, Switzerland and partly Belgium, where voters are directly
responsible for the election of members of the second chamber, senators are directly
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responsible to the voters and not to the states as such. Where governments of
federated states nominate senators directly, as is the case in the Bundesrat lil
Germany, and where legislatures of states or provinces (elected directly by voters) are
nominated, as is in the case in South Africa and partly in Malaysia, Belgium, India
and Namibia, the result could be that the interests of the governments or legislative
assemblies are given precedence over those of the voters (The Parliamentarian
October 1991: 51).
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 1993 was silent on the interaction
between the Senators and the provinces. Although the parties represented in the
respective provincial legislatures nominated senators, they were not accountable to
the provincial legislatures or provincial governments. Although the direct election of
senators is probably the most democratic option, a combination of nominations, direct
elections or partial elections could also be fairly representative, since specific interest
groups, as in the case of Belgium, India and Malaysia would then be represented
(Department of Constitutional Affairs, 1994: 25).
Although the objective of the of second chambers differs from that of first chambers,
the ideal nevertheless seems to be to make office bearers of second chambers
responsible directly to the voters of a state or to the various federated states. Although
members nominated could provide valuable inputs, the danger is that they could
become mere lackeys of the government of the day (Patterson and Wankle, 1972:
210). The legitimacy of a senate is, therefore, largely determined by the extent to
which it reflects the will of the population or the respective federated states (The
Parliamentarian July 1992: 34).
2.2.5 Powers
Wheare (1963: 201) believes that there is little sense in having two chambers in a
parliament that are equally representative of the population and have the same
powers, since this results in duplication. He makes the interesting statement that if a
state is governed in terms of the cabinet system, the latter institution can be
responsible to only one chamber - the popularly-elected chamber - which means that
such a chamber must have greater powers than the other.
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Based on observations on second chambers in member states of the Commonwealth,
Wheare concludes that a system of government by cabinet in a federation results in a
second chamber not being able to guarantee the effective protection of state's rights
even if it has the same legislative powers as a first chamber, precisely because such a
system of government is so strong that it will diminish the legislative powers of the
second chamber (Wheare, 1963: 206). This means therefore, that a system of
government by cabinet and a second chamber that has the same powers as the first
chamber are irreconcilable. In general, states in which the two chambers are equal do
not have a system of government by cabinet, such as the USA and Switzerland. The
different ways in which the powers are handled will be briefly discussed in the
following section.
2.2.5.1 Fully equal powers
An absolute requirement for chambers to have equal legislative powers is that both
should be able to approve legislation before it comes into effect (CDS internal
document no. I : 4, 1995: 36). Although initiation of legislation and the submission
thereof in any chamber may also be interpreted as a degree of equality, its approval is
the deciding requirement. Examples where chambers are equal in this regard are
Belgium, the USA, Switzerland and Malaysia; here both chambers have to approve
legislation before it can come into effect.
2.2.5.2 Equal powers with certain limitations
The most common occurrence is probably equal legislative powers between
chambers, with the exception of dealing with financial legislation, as is the case in
Nigeria and India. In these states there is equal power, but there is a possibility that
the will of the first chambers will dominate when it comes to financial matters in that
they are decided by vote in a joint sitting. In Australia procedures provide that the first
chamber cannot approve legislation rejected or amended by the second chamber,
although eventually, after a dissolution of the parliament and a repeat of such
rejection the new parliament can approve it in a joint sitting which in effect amounts
to an affirmation of the will of the first chamber. On certain matters that affect the
interests of federated states the second chambers in Germany and South Africa have
an absolute veto, but the chambers are nonetheless not equal since the will of the first
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chamber can prevail in respect of other matters (Department of Constitutional Affairs,
1994: 35).
The above examples indicate that although both chambers can theoretically have
relatively equal powers, their operation in practice amounts to the one chamber's
opinion eventually prevailing, which in essence points to inequality of the chambers.
2.2.5.3 Unequal powers
The greater powers of one chamber as against the other can present itself in different
ways. In some cases it is quite clear that the second chamber has lesser powers, while
this is disguised in other cases, as described in section 2.2.5.2 above. The determining
factor in this case, however, has to be whether mechanisms and techniques can be
applied in such a manner that the view of the one chamber can (eventually) prevail
over that of the other. The following possibilities exist in this regard:
• Confirmation by first chamber
A first chamber can have the power merely to confirm legislation approved by it
but rejected by the second chamber in order for it to come into effect. In Namibia
proposals by the second chamber to amend draft legislation (adopted by an
ordinary majority) can be dealt with by the first chamber as it deems fit. In
Germany an ordinary majority of the first chamber can invalidate rejection by the
second chamber if the second chamber did not reject it by a two-thirds majority
(ANC Head Quarters, 1995: 23).
• Delaying veto
The rejection or non-approval of a Bill by the second chamber can also serve to
delay its disposal, as is the case in Britain where the House of Lords can delay
Bills for a year excluding financial matters, which can be delayed for a shorter
period and prevent it from being passed in one session of the parliament. In
Canada the second chamber has a delaying veto of only one hundred and eighty
days when it comes to constitutional amendments (Blondel, 1990: 240).
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• Increased majority
In Namibia a rejection of a Bill with a two-thirds majority in the second chamber
has to be overturned by a similar majority in the first chamber in order for it to
come into effect. The same applies in Germany in respect of legislation that does
not affect the interests of federated states (NDl, 1996: 34).
• Joint sitting
A joint sitting of the two chambers as a means of solving a dispute between them
by a majority vote can cause the will of the first chamber to prevail, because first
chambers have more members than second chambers. This procedure is followed
in India when there is a dispute between the chambers over non-financial
legislation. In Nigeria this method also applies to financial matters or if a joint
committee of two chambers could not settle the dispute. In Australia a joint sitting
of the two chambers can also approve draft legislation with an absolute majority
after a complicated dispute resolution procedure has been followed, which
includes the dissolution of parliament (Copeland and Patterson, 1994: 180).
2.2.5.4 Division of powers between chambers
The examples of the states mentioned, show that second chambers can sometimes
have exclusive powers in respect of certain matters in that they can exercise a veto
over such matters, as in the case of Germany in respect of the interests of
provinces/federated states. In other cases it has been shown that the first chambers
have the final power as regards financial matters. Second chambers also perform
functions with regard to minority interests. With a view to reforming the Canadian
Senate, it was for instance proposed that the language and cultural interests of French
speaking residents should be protected and that, in order to achieve this goal, draft
legislation has to be approved by a majority of senators as well as a majority of
French speaking senators (Department of Constitutional Affairs, 1994: 48, also see
Dlamini: 1991: 24).
The foregoing indicates that chambers in some states have fully equal powers e.g.
Belgium, the USA, Switzerland and Malaysia, although second chambers, in by far
the majority of states have lesser powers than first chambers. This inequality is often
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disguised and becomes apparent in that first chambers can confirm decisions over
which there are disputes in order for them to come into effect; second chambers can
only delay decision-making; disputed legislation can be accepted by the first chamber
with an increased majority and legislation can be passed by means of a joint sitting,
which naturally favours the chamber with the most members (Kornberg: 1989: 60).
A division of powers between chambers can also occur where the second chamber, for
example, has exclusive decision-making powers in respect of provinces or regions e.g.
Germany or has the right to perform a protective function in respect of language and
cultural interests as in Belgium, while first chambers can have the final decision-
making power over financial matters (Parliamentary Research Unit: 1993: 34).
2.3 Disputes between chambers
Malherbe (1991: 189) points out that the authority and status of the two chambers in
relation to one another determine the resolution of disputes between two chambers of
a parliament. When chambers have the same legislative powers, the resolution of
disputes will take place in a manner that does not favour one chamber over the other,
while the resolution of disputes between unequal chambers will favour one or the
other. Disputes between chambers can therefore not be dealt with independent of
facets such as the aim of second chambers, the power and status of both chambers and
the equality of one chamber in relation to another (Constitutional and Parliamentary
Information, 1993: 27).
In the event of conflict between two chambers there are different approaches and/or
techniques that can be followed to reduce or resolve such conflict. The following are
brief descriptions of each of these techniques.
2.3.1 Confirmation by the "stronger" chamber
When one chamber has greater powers than the other, that chamber can overturn the
rejection of a Bill by the other chamber through confirmation of its original approval.
This procedure is followed in Namibia, Germany, India and Australia. In the case of
India it applies only to financial legislation, where the Lower House can accept or
reject amendments by the upper house in order for legislation to come into effect. In
Namibia this confirmation can be obtained through an ordinary majority if the second
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chamber rejected it with an ordinary majority. If it is rejected with two-thirds majority
it has to be approved/confirmed with the same majority, in the NA in order for it to
come into effect (Levmore, 1992: 60).
In Germany the Bundestag (first chamber) can, in respect of certain legislation, set
aside an objection of the Bundesrat with an ordinary or a two-thirds majority,
depending on whether a decision was taken with an ordinary or a two-thirds majority.
In the case of Australia, the House of Representatives (first chamber) can also deal as
it deems fit with requests by the Senate for amendments to or exclusions from
legislation (Schaffer, 1990: 24).
2.3.2 Delaying
The technique of delaying Bills to show dissatisfaction or to create opportunity for
reformulation or re-evaluation is illustrated by the procedures that can be followed by
the House of Lords in Britain (President's Council, 1990: 61). If the latter institution
rejects in two successive sessions an ordinary Bill adopted by the House of Commons
it can be submitted to the head of state only when a year has passed since its approval
by the lower house during the first and second sessions.
2.3.3 Joint committees
According to a President's Council report on decision-making and conflict resolution
mechanisms the purpose of joint committees is to remove the debate from the highly
politicised environment of parliament to a more informal atmosphere (President's
Council, 1990: 61). Malherbe points out that in some parliaments the convention is to
have all Bills considered by joint committees beforehand so that the committees serve
to prevent disputes rather than solve them (Malherbe, 1991: 33).
In the states mentioned the mechanisms of joint committees for the resolution of
disputes is applied in Nigeria, the USA and Germany. In Nigeria draft legislation
dealing with the collection or spending of revenue is referred to a joint financial
committee if there is a dispute between the two chambers (The Parliamentarian
October 1982: 14).
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In the USA a dispute between the two chambers is also referred to a joint committee,
while in Germany an arbitration committee, made up of an equal number of members
from each chamber and with strong representation from the "Lënder", deals with
disputes. This committee is of a semi permanent nature, not subject to party
discipline, only advisory in nature and has a high success rate (Jain, 1993: 218).
2.3.4 Joint sittings
In all of the parliaments studied, disputes are referred to a joint sitting of both
chambers for approval with an ordinary two-thirds majority. In the event of disputes
between the two chambers in Australia the parliament is dissolved and, if the new
parliament in tum cannot reach consensus, a joint sitting of the two chambers is
assembled where a majority can adopt the matter. In Canada the proposals for changes
to the Senate determined that disputes between the two chambers have to be settled by
means of a joint sitting and majority vote during such a sitting. In Switzerland there is
also a possibility of joint sittings to deal with matters by means of an ordinary
majority. If ordinary legislation, excluding legislation of financial nature in India is
approved by only one chamber, the two chambers can have a joint sitting for approval
by a majority (Department of Constitutional Affairs, 1994: 40 also see the South
African Parliamentary Research Unit, 1993: 9). Levmore (1992: 40) mentioned, that
the resolution of disputes by means of joint sittings favours the chamber with the most
members, particularly when decision-making occurs by means of an ordinary
majority.
2.3.5 Consultation between the chambers
In some parliaments where the two chambers are equal, as in Belgium, disputes over
Bills are settled by amending them and sending them back and forth until consensus is
reached (CDS internal document no.l, 1995: 12). If the chambers fail to reach
agreement, the draft legislation expires. Apart from the fact that the Senate in
Malaysia is limited as regards the initiation and amendment of legislation, the
procedure followed between the chambers is the same as described above.
2.3.6 Referendum or Election
In Switzerland referendums on certain legislative matters can be enforced by means of
petitions containing a certain number of signatures. In Australia, both chambers can
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be dissolved and an election called if consensus cannot be reached on a Bill. Malherbe
(1991: 210) believes that this provision is aimed at protecting the federated states as
represented in the Australian senate, but at the same time at complying with the
popular will.
2.3.7 Advisory bodies
An advisory body may also be used to remove a dispute from the direct political line
of fire and propose solutions to the chambers as objectively as possible in calmer
circumstances (CDS internal document no.1: 13, 1995: 23). Such an advisory body,
which could be made up of members of both chambers, should consist of recognised
experts e.g. in Belgium and India. The principle on which technical committees
consisting of experts submitted reports to the Negotiating Council during the Multi-
Party Negotiating Process (MPNP) in South Africa is an analogous example.
2.3.8 Decision- making body
In order for a body to have legitimacy to remove a dispute from the political arena for
a decision, it should be constituted in a manner acceptable to both chambers.
Nominations from one chamber can, for example, be submitted to the other chamber
for approval to ensure mutual acceptability. The President's Council, which has
performed such a function in South Africa, was controversial precisely because its
composition favoured the majority party. If disputes arose as to whether a particular
Bill was unconstitutional, provision could also be made for it to be referred to the
Constitutional Court (President's Council, 1990: 61).
2.3.9 Differentiation between different types of draft legislation
The examples studied showed that different types of legislation could be dealt with in
different ways. Examples where draft legislation of a financial nature is dealt with in a
manner that reflects the dominance of the first chamber over the second are to be
found in India, where the powers of the chambers are relatively equal, except for
financial matters. Malherbe (1991: 211) believes that distinctions between different
categories of Bills are useful where the chambers are constituted differently, and one
chamber has a greater interest in some matters than others do.
28
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
In Germany a specific distinction is made between, for example, matters that affect
the interests of the "Lander" and provinces and for which the approval of the second
chamber is required. Different procedures can be followed to reduce or resolve
conflict between chambers. This is mostly done in a manner that reflects which
chamber has the greater powers. For example, the dominant of the two chambers can
confirm an earlier decision after which it becomes law without the approval of the
Senate, as is the case with financial matters in India. In some states such as Britain,
Australia, Belgium and Namibia the second chamber can delay draft legislation to
show dissatisfaction with it or to create an opportunity for reformulation and re-
evaluation (Department of Constitutional Affairs, 1994: 18 also see Discussion Forum
for South Africa, 1995: 14).
Joint committees, which are aimed at removmg the debate from a politicised
environment, can serve to prevent disputes over draft legislation, while they may also
be used to resolve disputes between two chambers as in Nigeria, the USA and
Germany. Consensus may be reached in such a committee or voting by secret ballot
(to reduce party political influence) can increase the chances of reaching a decision.
An ordinary or special majority as is the case in Australia, Switzerland and India can
also refer disputes between the two chambers to a joint sitting for approval. Dispute
resolution in this manner could favour the chamber with the most members,
particularly if it is done by an ordinary majority decision (Department of
Constitutional Affairs, 1994: 47 also see Constitutional and Parliamentary
Information, 1993: 4).
Where the chambers are equal, for example in Belgium, bills that give rise to disputes
are amended and sent to and from between the chambers until consensus is reached,
otherwise they expire. Referendums or elections are dispute-resolution mechanisms
that can be used in Switzerland and Australia respectively, while advisory bodies
made up of experts and appointed by members of both chambers play a part in
resolving disputes. Decisions can also be referred to a decision-making body e.g. the
Arbitration Court in Belgium. Different dispute-resolution mechanisms can be applied
for different types of Bills for example financial legislation where the stronger
chamber can confirm it and legislation that affects the interests of provinces or
federated states and that require the exclusive approval of the second chamber
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(Department of Constitutional Affairs, 1994: 51). Just as there are different ways of
resolving disputes, different mechanisms are employed to take decisions. In the
following section various decision-making procedures will be discussed.
2.4 Decision-making in the second chamber
Decision-making procedures in second chambers are relevant because of the different
interests represented in second chambers can be promoted or prejudiced by them. The
following ways of decision-making exist in this regard.
2.4.1 Constituent majorities
When a majority of every region or province in a second chamber or a majority group
representing a specific interest has to support draft legislation before it comes into
effect, such an interest group has a veto with regard to certain specified matters. It
could be an effective way of protecting such interests, but it could also delay/prevent
decision-making, which in tum could lead to frustration if applied to too many matters
(CDS internal document no 1:18, 1995: 14). Proposals for changes to the Canadian
Senate also indicated that draft legislation that affects the French language or culture
has to be approved by a majority of senators and amendments must also be made by a
majority of French-speaking senators (Department of Constitutional Affairs, 1994:
37).
In Belgium, elected members of each chamber are divided into a French or Dutch-
speaking group in respect of certain matters and the approval of such language groups
is required for decision-making. If 17% of a language group is opposed to a motion,
for example, it is referred to a Council of Ministers (executive authority) for a
recommendation within thirty days, after which it is considered again (Constitutional
and Parliamentary Information, 1993: 15).
2.4.2 Ordinary and increased majorities
Decision-making on all matters of an ordinary majority in a second chamber could be
prejudicial to groups or individuals that are always on the losing side owing to
representation of a particular interest. It is found that decisions on ordinary legislation
can often be approved by means of a majority vote (as in Belgium and India),
constitutional amendments by increased majorities (e.g. Belgium) and sensitive
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matters by the constituent majorities, which leads to a majority requiring the approval
of a minority or minorities to get a certain matter passed (Brenman & Hamlin, 1992:
14).
2.4.3 Differentiation between sensitive and other matters
It may be said that majority decision-making should apply to all but certain sensitive
matters. With regard to the latter constituent majorities, increased majorities or even
an appeal to a decision-making body or a constitutional court may be required
(Department of Constitutional Affairs, 1994: 38). This limits the protection of specific
interests to those matters that are really important to these groups. Examples of this
are to be found in Germany in respect of the veto that senators from federated states
have with regard to the interests of federated states.
2.4.4 Postponement of decision-making
In order to reach consensus in the second chamber it is advisable to apply the method
of consultation before drafting legislation on sensitive issues (CDS internal document
no 1:18, 1995: 34). Postponement of a decision if a minority or specific interest group
objects to draft legislation with the view to the promotion of consensus by other
means could prevent decisions from being made hastily, such as in Belgium where the
objection of the representatives of a language group can be referred to the Council of
Ministers to make a recommendation to the second chamber (Department of
Constitutional Affairs, 1994: 52).
In the states examined it was found that constituent majorities in second chambers
have to be obtained in respect of the following matters in particular: the interest of
provinces or federated states in Germany, language interests in Belgium and language
and cultural interests in proposals in the Canadian Senate. Ordinary majorities can be
required in respect of ordinary matters (normal legislation), while increased and
constituent majorities or even an appeal to court may be required in extreme cases in
respect of important or sensitive matters. In this way the protection of specific
interests is limited to matters that are vital to such groups, without continuously being
a source of frustration to the majority. The postponement of decision-making of draft
legislation about which there are fundamental defences in second chambers and the
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use of more informal consensus seeking methods are further ways of accommodating
as many interests as possible (ANC Parliamentary Research Unit 1996: 14).
The redundancy of the South African senate led to its abolishment in 1996. It is
important to know why this institution was perceived a failure, because its failure is
the premise on which the NCOP was built. This section outlined the fundamental
characteristics of second chambers in general. It also highlighted the different variants
that can exist in these regards. The following section will focus on how the South
African senate was structured in relation to the general characteristics discussed
earlier.
2.5 Evaluation of the Senate
In order to determine whether the existence of the South African Senate could have
been justified, it was essential to determine whether this institution meets the
objectives of second chambers as they are found in most democratic states. Firstly, the
Senate has to be able to act as a watchdog over legislative action (reviewing role) and
secondly, it has to be able to play a part in specific interests, for example, in
protecting provinces in the national legislature (Interview: Palmer, 10 December 1999
also see discussion in section 2.2.4 and 2.2.5).
In view of the above it could be argued that the South African Senate could not playa
proper reviewing role in respect of the first chamber (excluding provincial interests, in
respect of which it has special powers) since the powers of the institution were
restricted in this regard and its party political composition did not differ in essence
from the NA. As regards the protection of specific interests, it could be argued that
provincial interests, and the interests of smaller provinces in particular, did enjoy
effective protection in the second chamber. A deficiency however existed with regard
to the lack of accountability to, and formal interaction of senators with the provinces
they represent (Cloete, 1995: 25).
With regard to the Constitution (1993) it was clear that the objective of the legislature
was not to grant direct protection to minorities. Minorities did have indirect protection
in so far as certain political parties were willing to safeguard their interests. This
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protection might not have been particularly effective in view of the limited support
enjoyed by the minority parties in comparison with the majority party in the Senate.
In the view of the Senate's evident shortcomings in respect of its legislative review
function, accountability of the executive and the protection of specific interests, the
question arose on how the institution could be changed, with due regard for existing
societal values and viewpoints. The ANC wanted a unicameral system. They argued
that provinces could be directly represented in the NA by electing half of this house's
members from provincial lists 8. The other parties agreed that Provinces should be
directly represented in the NA. This did however not solve the problem of
accountability" and the specific link with provincial legislators that in fact led to the
abandonment of the Senate. This, and also the fact that there was uncertainty amongst
the ANC itself about the establishment of a second chamber or not brought about the
establishment of the bicameral system that exists today'". Parties were united on the
idea that it should address the shortcomings of the Senate as mentioned above. I I The
following possibilities/options for changing various aspects of the Senate was
considered in this regard.
2.5.1 Composition
The method which seems the most feasible for obtaining a composition different from
that of the first in the second chamber, without prejudicing the democratic principle,
is to have different terms of office for the two chambers while retaining the five-year
term of office for each chamber. For example, the election of provincial legislatures
and the appointment of senators could be separated from the election of members of
the NA. In practice this would mean that both elections would be held on the adoption
of the final constitution, but that the next provincial/senate election would take place
only three years later. The term of office of the members of the first chamber would
then expire after five years as usual. In this way the Senate could, in due course, of
time reflect a composition that differs from that of the first chamber. The same
8 The NA is still composed of 200 members selected on the national list and 200 members selected on provincial lists.
9 Senators were not accountable to provinces during the time of the Senate.
10 Interview: N. Ackerman, 8 June 2000
II Interview: N. Ackerman, 8 June 2000
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naturally applies to the provincial legislatures (See discussions in sections 2.2.2 and
2.2.3.).
This principle is applied successfully in different countries, amongst others, the USA,
Namibia, Australia and Germany (Department of Constitutional Affairs, 1994: 30).
The practice of periodically replacing a proportion of the senators would not be
feasible, since a different method of appointing senators, which is not without merit,
is followed in South Africa. Criticism against this option was that in practice it would
result in South Africa having an election every two to three years. Parties were
unanimous that this system was too complicated and all parties rejected it (Interview:
Ackerman, 8 June 2000).
A further method for having the composition of the second chamber different from
that of the first is to nominate the representatives of the interest groups as discussed in
section 2.2.4. This method is problematic since virtually insurmountable problems are
created in determining which interests should or should not be given representation,
apart from the fact that it is undemocratic and that the true sphere of such groups
essentially lies outside the legislature (Department of Constitutional Affairs, 1994:
30). There were nevertheless early indications that traditional leaders could, through
the proposed Chamber of Traditional Leaders, lay claim to representation in the
Senate. The IFP was the only party that supported this idea (Interview: Ackerman, 8
June 2000).
As regards the possibility of amending the formula for determining the support of
parties in the Senate, it should be noted that there were different interpretations of the
operation of the formula for determining delegates as contained in Section 48 of the
Constitution (1993). For example, it could be noted in this regard that the operation of
the formula has resulted in practice in a party such as the FF, which has only 5.6%
support in the Mpumalanga province, having a representative for that province in the
Senate. A different interpretation of the Constitution would have it that in this case the
FF is not entitled to a seat (Discussion Forum for South Africa, 1995: 23). To amend
the formula, by which parties obtained proportional representation in the Senate by
lowering the required support threshold, would mean that the majority party in each
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province would have to give up some of its representation in the Senate if an equal
number of representatives per province was to be maintained.
Although members of the second chamber should ideally be elected directly by the
population, there are certain problems in this regard. Three different elections already
have to be held, whether they are held for the three spheres of government in tum or
are held at the same time it resulted in one more ballot paper. There was also the
argument that there is not too much sense in having two chambers that represent the
population in same way, especially since provincial interests are also represented in
the NA; this could merely result in duplication. If senators were directly elected they
represent the voters and not the provincial governments/legislatures, which could
result in conflict over who actually represents the interests of a province (Cloete,
1995: 35).
2.5.2 Term of office
Options such as having members of the second chamber serve for a longer term of
office than the first chamber and having a proportion of the members step down at a
certain time were not recommended, despite the advantages that they hold (such as
providing continuity and dignity to such an institution without removing it from
popular control). The reason is that the way in which South African senators are
appointed by the provincial legislatures had merit; the appointment of senators and
their terms of office ought to coincide with the election and terms of office of
members of provincial governments (Discussion Forum for South Africa, 1995: 10).
2.5.3 Qualifications and nature of members
Since senators represented provincial interests, it was advisable to set the requirement
that they should be residents of the provinces that they represent. No residential
qualification was set with senators. See discussion in 2.2.2. This qualification would
further extend the unique composition of the Senate and the central party structure
would not be able to nominate a person who is not a resident to represent a province
(Department of Constitutional Affairs, 1994: 30 also see Discussion Forum for South
Africa, 1995: 12). Providing that a person has to be resident in a particular province.
for at least two years before he/she may be nominated could even have extended the
residential qualification set for senators.
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2.5.4 Interest groups or institutions that are represented
Although the South African Senate was composed of a number of senators from each
province and nominated by the parties represented in the respective provincial
legislature, the Constitution was silent on the interaction between the Senate and the
provinces. The Senators were therefore not accountable to the provincial governments
or the provincial legislatures. Furthermore, dual membership of the Senate and a
provincial legislature was expressly prohibited. This contrasts, for example, with
Germany where such dual membership is required and Switzerland where it is
permitted (Watts, 1994: 34).
Since senators had to promote provincial interests regarding draft legislation that had
a bearing on the provinces and the drafting of the new constitution, it was advisable to
establish some kind of mechanism to provide for interaction between the Senate and
both the executive and the legislative provincial authorities. This could help to take
care of provincial interests at national government level effectively.
In order to address relations between the provincial and national legislatures in the
new constitution, the following options were available:
• Senators to be nominated by parties represented in a provincial legislature in
accordance with proportional representation (in practice this means that the
various party caucuses nominate such persons). Consideration may be given to
providing for the appointment of senators by way of a resolution/motion of the
provincial legislature, in order to address the matter of accountability.
• The provincial legislatures can participate directly, through the Senate, in the
legislative process at national level. In Germany the second chamber consists
of members of the Lander governments, which appoint and recall Bundesrat
members. Members of the Bundesrat therefore represent the federated states
and are bound by instructions from these states. This mechanism also provides
an opportunity for specialists on certain matters (from the provincial
legislatures) to be rotated in the Bundesrat to ensure the best possible input at
national level (Department of Constitutional Affairs, 1995: 25).
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2.10.5 Powers between the two chambers
The South African Senate clearly did not have legislative powers equal to those of the
NA, which is not unusual if compared with international examples (See the discussion
in section 2.2.5). The Senate nevertheless had substantial powers, but its composition
(which does not differ substantially from that of the first chamber in party political
terms) and the fact that there was no close interaction between senators and the
provincial authorities they represented, placed a question mark over the exercise of
these powers. A mechanism was established to improve interaction between provinces
and senators, attempting to change the composition of the second chamber over time,
so that this chamber would represent broader interests and thereby more effectively
exercise the powers that it has (Murray, 1998: 45).
2.6 Conclusion
In December 1995 a joint South African and Namibian delegation participating in a
study mission focused on the representative nature of the second chambers of
parliaments in India and Malaysia 12. The common thread in the South African and
Namibian situations was to decide on how to maximise presentation of provincial and
regional interests in national policy (NDl, 1996: 8). The Bundesrat of Germany was
also visited subsequently. The South African constitutional experts wanted to create a
second house that would serve South Africa as a deeply divided society and as a
country in transition at the same time. The product of their study tours and
negotiations is a uniquely South African product - the National Council of Provinces.
In this chapter the route from Senate to NCOP was sketched. An attempt was made to
outline the problems that led to the abolishment of the Senate and the process
followed to establish the NCOP. It is clear that the senate was a mere duplicate of the
NA without any different powers assigned to it. Senators were not accountable to
provinces but rather to their political parties. This led to a situation where senators
simply became divorced from their provinces. The duplication in functions between
the Senate and the NA led to the abolishment of this institution and gave rise to the
12 India and Malaysia were selected for the study among other countries based on two criteria:
I) the states' role in electing members to the second house
2) their status as developing nations (NDl, 1996: 1).
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creation of the NCOP. In the following chapter a general description of the NCOP
will be provided.
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Chapter 3
Structure of the NCOP
3.1 Introduction
This chapter provides a general description of the structure, committee system,
method of selecting delegates and the information flow in the NCOP.
The legislative authority of South Africa is vested in Parliament that consists of two
chambers, namely the NA and the newly constructed NCOP. The NCOP, along with
the NA, is a component of Parliament. It represents the provinces to ensure that
provincial interests are taken into account in national government. It does this mainly
by participating in the national legislative process and by providing a national forum
for public consideration of issues affecting the provinces (NCOP, Imperative of Co-
operative Governance, 1998: 5). The constitutional order of the South African State
has undergone tremendous changes with the adoption of the final Constitution in
1996. The most prominent feature of this Constitution, legislatively, is certainly the
erection of a new second house - the NCOP.
The NCOP is a uniquely South African product largely modelled on the German
Bundesrat and the Indian House of Provinces (NCOP Hansard, 18 September, 1997:
133). It is believed that these models were used because of their acclaimed
achievements insofar as the protection of provincial interests are concerned (NCOP
Hansard, 18 September, 1997: 134). The most important constitutional functions
assigned to the NCOP are to represent provincial interest in the national legislative
process and to play an oversight role in relation to the provinces and the Executive
(Constitution ofRSA, 1996).
The NCOP replaced the former Senate and came into operation on 6 February 1997,
in terms of South Africa's new Constitution. The first fifty-four Permanent Delegates
of the NCOP made and subscribed to the oath under the presiding of the President of
the Constitutional Court Justice Arthur Chakalson. On 6 February 1997, Mr. Lekota
and Mr. Ngcuka were elected to the positions of Chairperson and Deputy Chairperson
respectively. The Constitution provides for two deputy chairpersons, a permanent and
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a rotating position. Mr. Frank Mdlalose, who was the Premier of KwaZulu-Natal
Province at the time, was elected the first rotating Deputy Chairperson of the Council.
Mr. Mathews Phosa of Mpumalanga followed him in 1998. Mr. Manne Dipico,
Premier of the Northern Cape replaced Mr Phosa in 1999. Advocate Ngoako
Ramatholdi is now holding this position (Office of the NCOP Chief Whip 29
November 2000). It was agreed that the position of second deputy chairperson would
rotate among provinces, commencing in 1997 with KwaZulu-Natal (NCOP, NCOP in
Review, 1999: 5).
Ms Naledi Pandor replaced Mr. Ngcuka as Deputy Chairperson after his departure to
the National Directorate of Public Prosecutions in May 1998. Ms Pandor was
appointed as Chairperson of the NCOP and Mr. M.L. Mushwana as the permanent
deputy-chairperson after the 1999 elections (NCOP, NCOP News, August 1999: 5).
3.2 Composition of the National Council of Provinces
The NCOP consists of a hundred delegates. There is a single delegation from each of
the nine provinces and each delegation consists of ten persons. The composition of the
delegation is:
a. four special delegates consisting of:
• the Premier of the province or, if the Premier is not available, any member
of the provincial legislature designated by the Premier either generally or
for any specific business before the National Council of Provinces; and
• three other special delegates; and
b. Six permanent delegates appointed in terms of section 61(2) of the Constitution
(Constitution of RSA, 1996).
The Constitution also makes provision for the representation of local government in
the NCOP. The delegates representing organised local government do not have voting
status. They may however participate in the committee meetings as well as the
debates in the chamber. According to the liaison office of the South African Local
Government Association (SALGA) in Cape Town, representatives of SALGA in the
NCOP are nominated as follows. SALGA, national, consists of fifty-four members -
six delegates from the nine provincial associations. Out of these fifty-four members
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the executive committee and the chief executive officer nominate members to
represent SALGA on the national platform. These nominations are done on the basis
of interest and subject knowledge. The nominated members then participate in the
necessary committee meetings to negotiate SALGA's position (SALGA's
Parliamentary Liaison Office, 13 May 1998).
Table 2: Party representation in the Provincial Legislatures based on the 1994 &
1999 elections
Parties Eastern Mpumalanga KwaZulu- Northern Northern North Free Gauteng Western
Cape Natal Cape Province West State Cape
Year '94 '99 '94 '99 '94 '99 '94 '99 '94 '99 '94 '99 '94 '99 '94 '99 '94 '99
ACDP 1 1 3 I I 1 I
ANC 48 47 25 26 26 32 15 20 38 44 26 27 26 25 50 50 14 18
DP 1 4 1 2 7 1 1 I 1 2 13 3 5
UDM 9 I 1 I 1 I
PAC 1 I I I 1
IFP 41 40 3 3
NP 6 2 3 1 9 3 12 8 I 1 3 I 4 2 21 23 17
MF 1
FA I
FF 2 1 2 1 I I I 2 I 5 I 1
Number 56 63 30 30 81 83 30 30 40 49 30 33 30 30 86 73 42 42
of seats
(Parliamentary Public Education Department, 1999).
The ANC was the majority party in seven of the nine provinces after the 1994
elections. This gave the ANC the majority vote in the NCOP (See table 2) The scene
did not change much after the 1999 elections. The ANC still is the majority party in
seven provinces. The number of seats that a party holds in a legislature determines the
number of delegates of that party in the NCOP (See table 3).
3.2.1 Manner of appointment
One could argue that delegates from the NCOP are appointed through a combination
of nomination, direct election and partial election (See discussion in section 2.2.1).
Political parties represented in provincial legislatures, whose members are elected by
the voters, nominate delegates on a proportional basis, which therefore reflects the
composition of the provincial legislature.
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The allocation of delegates to the NCOP is facilitated through legislation. The
Determination of Delegates (Act 69 of 1998) provides a formula to determine the
delegates represented in the NCOP. The Act is a continuation of where the
Constitution left off regarding the issue of determination of delegates to the NCOP. It
provides the formula for the determination of permanent and special delegates that a
party is entitled to in the provincial delegation.
Section 2(1) of Act 69 of 1998 refers to section 61(1) of the Constitution. The formula
contained in Section 61(1) is provided for in Part B of Schedule 3 of the Constitution,
which reads as follows:
" The number of delegates in a provincial delegation to the National Council of
Provinces to which a party is entitled, must be determined by multiplying the number
of seats the party holds in the provincial legislature by ten and dividing the result by
the number of seats in the legislature plus one" (Determination of Delegates Act No.
69 of 1998).
Table 3: State of Parties in the NCOP
PROVINCE PERMANENT DELEGATES SPECIAL DELEGATES
ANC NP IFP FF OP ANC NP IFP
Year '96 '99 '96 '99 '96 '99 '96 '99 '96 '99 '96 '99 '96 '99 '96 '99
Eastern Cape 5 1 4
Free State 4 1 1 4
Gauteng 3 1 1 I 3 1
Kwazulu-Natal 1 I 3 1 2 2
Mpumalanga 4 1 1 4
Northern Cape 3 2 1 2 2
Northern 6 4
Province
North West 4 1 1 4
Western Cape 2 3 1 1 '"_,
(Public Education Department, 1999 also see Section 60 of the Constitution of the
Republic of South Africa)
An example will be used to illustrate the various permutations in the composition of
the NCOP. The example will only concentrate on the 1994 party representation to
avoid duplication. These permutations are very important because it determine the
composition of the second house (NCOP). The composition is important in the sense
that national legislation could be amended and initiated by this house. The ANC for
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instance had a two third majority in the NCOP even though they lacked that in the
NA. The ANC could thus force the NCOP to push legislation through without
consideration of other parties' views.
ExampleI3
Western Cape Legislature = 42 seats in the legislature
Proportional representation of each party for 1994 were as follows:
NP - 23 seats
ANC - 14 seats
DP - 3 seats
ACDP - 1 seat
Freedom Front - 1 seat
The formula is applied as follows:
NP = 23 times ten divided by (42+ 1)
= 5,348837209
Likewise the other figures appear as follows:
ANC = 3,255813953
DP = 0,697674418
ACDP = 0,2320558139
Freedom Front = 0,2320558139
On the basis of these calculations, the NP is entitled to five delegates and the ANC to
three delegates (fractions are disregarded). The total number of delegates to the
NCOP from a province must be ten. There are therefore two seats left, which still
need to be allocated.
The next step is to apply the provisions of Schedule 3 Part B (1) of the Constitution
which provides that the surplus, (as the case is above) "must compete with similar
surpluses accruing to any other party/parties, and any undistributed delegates in the
delegation must be allocated to the party or parties in the sequence of the highest
surplus". That would mean the DP, which have the highest remainder left must
13 As prepared for a committee briefing by M. Brandt in conjunction with M. Bhabha, June 1998.
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therefore get the next seat. (Fractions now relevant). The second highest fraction is
that of the NP and they would therefore get the second seat.
The allocation now reads as follows:
NP = 6 seats
ANC = 3 seats
DP = 1 seat
This makes the full contingent of the provincial delegation, both permanent and
special delegates. Section 2 (2) provides a formula for the determination of the
number of permanent delegates accruing to each party.
In terms of Section 2(1) the DP is entitled to one delegate only and therefore section
2(2) does not apply to them. The ANC and the NP are entitled to more than one
delegate; hence section 2(2) applies to them. The formula provided in Section 2(2) is
applied as follows:
Determination of permanent delegates.
NP = total number of delegates times six divided by ten, fractions disregarded.
= 6 times 6 / 10
= 3,6 (disregard fraction)
=3
Likewise the ANC
= 1,8 (disregard fraction)
=1
The allocation of permanent delegates is thus as follows:
NP=3
ANC= 1
DP = 1 (In terms of Section 2(1»
Section 2(3) provides the formula for determining the special delegates allocated to a
party.
It is done as follows:
Total number of delegate due to party minus permanent delegates as determined in
terms of section 2(2) and 2(3).
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NP: 6-3
=3
The NP has 3 special delegates.
ANC: 3-1
=2
Section 2(3) states that if the number of permanent delegates due to a party is less
than its special delegate component, the special delegate component must be reduced
to a number at least equal to its permanent delegate component. Accordingly the
figures of the NP need not to be adjusted, however, certain adjustments need to be
made to the ANC's allocation. The ANC's permanent delegate component is less than
the special delegate component. The special delegate component therefore must be
reduced in favour of the permanent component. The ANC's final allocation will thus
look as follows: Permanent delegates: 2
Special Delegates: 1
The final permutation of permanent delegates is thus,
NP=3
ANC=2
DP= 1
Total number of permanent delegates = 6
The rationale behind ensuring that the number of permanent delegates is always
higher than the special delegates assigned to the party is to guarantee that the ruling
party in a province always has the higher member of permanent delegates. In the
instance where parties enjoy the same degree of proportional representation in the
legislature the remaining seat is allocated to the party that received the higher number
of actual votes in the provincial election between the two parties.
Section 2(4) of the Act provides for the instance where the total number of special
delegates is less than four. The undistributed number of special delegates must then be
allocated to the party/parties to whom delegates were allocated in terms of item 2 of
Part B of Schedule 3 to the Constitution in the same sequence that delegates were
allocated in terms of that item.
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Example
Western Cape Legislature = 42 seats
NP - 6 seats
ANC - 6 seats
FF - 6 seats
IFP - 6 seats
DP - 6 seats
ACDP - 5 seats
PAC - 5 seats
Party X - 2 seats
In terms of Section 2(1)
NP = 1,395348837
ANC = 1,395348837
FF = 1,395348837
DP = 1,395348837
IFP = 1,395348837
ACDP = 1,162790697
PAC = 1, 162790697
Party X = 0, 465116279
Seven Parties are each entitled to one delegate in terms of section 2(1). Because seven
parties result in a fraction higher than one, seven parties are entitled to have a
permanent delegate. However, there are only six seats for permanent delegates. One
permanent delegate must now become a special delegate. In section 2(4) it is stated
that: "delegates of the parties that are entitled to only one delegate in the delegation of
that particular province must, despite subsection (1), become special delegates".
The party with the lowest remaining fraction should give up its permanent seat for a
special seat. The lowest remaining fraction is that of the PAC and the ACDP. In a
case like this, where a tie occur, the party (one of the two) which received the lowest
number of votes in the provincial election between the two should give up its
permanent seat and be allocated one special delegate seat.
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There are now three remaining seats left for special delegates. The parties compete for
these three seats in terms of Schedule 3 Part B (2) of the Constitution. Party X has got
the highest remaining fraction and therefore a special delegate should be allocated to
them. The second highest is that of the ANC, NP, FF, IFP, DP. They all have equal
remaining fractions. The ACDP and the PAC falls out because they have the lowest
remaining fraction. In this regard a policy decision is needed. The remaining two seats
are allocated to the competing parties which received the highest actual votes in the
provincial elections. The two remaining seats are shared by the two parties, which
received the highest number of actual votes in the provincial election.
The final allocation will thus look as follows:
NP= 1
ANC= 1
DP= 1
FF= 1
IFP=l
ACDP= 1
Total number of permanent delegates = 6
Special delegates:
PAC which received the lowest vote of the two parties = 1
Party X in terms of Schedule 3 Part B (2) = 1
DP which received the highest vote of the competing parties = 1
NP which received the second highest vote of the competing parties = 1
All the parties agreed on this formula (Select committee on Constitutional Affairs and
Public Administration, 31 August 1997). According to Bhabha the reason for this is
that the formula was already negotiated during the constitution making process as it is
contained in Section 60 of the Constitution (Meeting of Select Committee on
Constitutional Affairs, 31 August 1997). The table assistants in the NCOP confirmed
that this formula is followed through in practice (Office of the NCOP Deputy-
Chairperson, November 1999).
47
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
3.2.2 Term of Office
The term of office of NCOP delegates coincides with that of the members in the NA.
The Constitution states in section 49(1) that the NA is elected for a period of five
years (Constitution RSA, 1996). This means that unless in extraordinary
circumstances like a military coup, NCOP delegates are appointed every five years.
3.2.3 Qualification and nature of members
A permanent delegate of the NCOP must be eligible to be a member of the provincial
legislature (Constitution RSA Section 62 (1), 1996). The requirements spelled out
further in the Constitution does not differ from any requirements laid down for
persons to become public office bearers e.g. the person must not be an unrehabilitated
insolvent, or be declared of unsound mind by a court of law (Constitution RSA
Section 106 (c and d), 1996).
3.2.4 Interest groups or institutions that are represented by the NCOP
The constitutional mandate of the NCOP is contained in Chapter 4 of the Constitution.
According to Section 42(4) of the Constitution the "National Council of Provinces
represents the provinces to ensure that provincial interests are taken into account in
the national sphere of government. It does this mainly by participating in the national
legislative process by providing a national forum for public consideration of issues
affecting the provinces" (Constitution RSA, 1996 also see discussion in section 2.2.4).
The method of selecting delegates, as discussed earlier (See section 3.2.1), plays a
vital role in ensuring that provincial interests are taken into account at national level.
To be able to analyse the constitutional powers of the NCOP it is necessary to explore
the responsibility placed on the NCOP by the constitution with regards to co-operative
governance.
3.3 Constitutional powers of the NCOP
A discussion on the responsibility of the NCOP with regards to its constitutional
powers such as oversight and intervention powers requires also an understanding of
the following:
• the concept of co-operative governance
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• the role that the NCOP is expected to play within the context of co-operative
governance.
3.3.1 Co-operative governance
Before we can explore the importance of co-operative governance for the NeOp we
should take time to consider why this concept was so important to South Africa's
constitution-makers. According to Mr. Valli Moosa, Minister of Constitutional
Development at the time, there are three reasons why the concept of co-operative
governance was introduced in the constitution making process of South Africa
(NCOP, NCOP in Review, 1999: 4).
The first imperative was to ensure a single, united South Africa. The members of the
Constitutional Assembly introduced the term of co-operative governance to reverse
the apartheid attempt to balkanise the country. The second imperative is that it was
seen as a tool to address patterns of inequity, characterised by distinct areas of
affluence and poverty. The government and state had to be structured in a way that it
would allow it to overcome these distorted patterns of development. The third
imperative was to take the government closer to the people. The constitution makers
avoided the creation of an over bureaucratic state, because they felt that it would not
be sufficiently responsive to the citizens of the country. Hence, the need for a more
decentralised administration.
It is clear that the need for an inclusive government existed. The South African state
had to unite a nation divided along cultural, language and religious lines. These
imperatives resulted in the codification of the concept of co-operative governance as
expressed in Chapter 3 of the South African Constitution. This section states that:
" All spheres of government and all organs of state within each sphere must co-
operate with one another in mutual trust and good faith by -
• fosteringfriendly relationships
• assisting and supporting one another
• informing one another of, and consulting one another on, matters of common
interests
• coordinating their actions and legislation with one another,
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• adhering to agreed procedures and
• avoiding legal proceedings against one another" (Constitution RSA, 1996).
Certain broad points about the principle of co-operative governance should be borne
in mind on the topic of co-operative governance. First, is that the codification of co-
operative government is a uniquely South African product, without precedent in any
other country (NCOP, Imperative of Co-operative Governance, 1998: 18). Secondly,
is it one of two inter-related concepts upon which the constitutional order was
founded. The other concept is that of the notion of 'sphere of government'. The White
Paper on Local Government (1997: 26) illustrates the significance of these two
concepts. The relevant section in this document reads that a:
"Sphere of government captures the idea that national, provincial and local
government are each distinctive and have equal status and therefore must have
constitutional leeway to define and express their unique characters. 'Co-operative
governance' on the other hand implies that spheres are inter-dependent within the
overall structure of the state, and so must work together to ensure effective
government as a sum of its parts" (White Paper on Local Government, 1997:33).
Figure 1: Spheres of Government
LOCAL
GOVERNMENT
PROVINCIAL
GOVERNMENT NATIONAL
GOVERNMENT
3.3.2 Spheres of government
The South African Government is organized in three spheres of government (See
Figure 1). It is important to note that the concept tiers or levels, which is commonly
used in constitutional law, political science and public administration, are not used
50
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
(NCOP, NCOP in Review, 1999: 14). This provision has two important
consequences. Firstly, the three spheres have constitutional protection, which means
that local government may not be abolished by either the national or provincial
governments. Secondly, the use of the concept "sphere" is not only symbolic, but is
also important from both a theoretical and practical point of view (NCOP Hansard, 22
April 1998: 354). It emphasizes the non-hierarchical structure of the three spheres of
government which in turns respects the right of each sphere to conduct its own
activities within the framework of the constitution. In theory, the organisation of
government is therefore more of a co-operative, matrix model than a rigid, top-down
model as found in classical unitary states where provincial and local powers are based
on decentralization of powers by the central government.
This approach to government captures three important properties of the constitutional
dispensation for co-operative governance.
The first property of co-operative government is that it consists of a basket of
substantive values to ensure good governance at the end. It also consists of procedural
values that support the operating of processes and structures (Select Committee On
Constitutional Affairs, 31 August 1997). The second is that co-operative government
creates certain legal obligations such as avoiding legal proceedings against each other
for all three spheres of government and organs of state (NCOP, Imperative of Co-
operative Governance, 1998: 14).
Thirdly, the use of the concepts 'co-operative government' and 'spheres of
government' requires a corresponding emphasis on defining roles, responsibilities,
and relations (the three R's) of and between the three spheres of government and the
organs of state, at political and administrative levels (Mayibuye, 1997: 15). An
informal policy structure, Minmec'", was designed to deal with this aspect of co-
operative governance. Minmee consists of a Minister and members of the executive
council of a province that deals with the relevant ministry. This informal executive leg
of government is gaining more and more statutory power. At these meetings policy
14 Interdepartmental Ministerial Forum consisting of the national line functioning Ministers and the provincial Mec's e.g.
Minister of Education and the relevant MEC's. These fora meet when it is deemed necessary, more or less four times a year
(Setai, 1994: 13).
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issues are discussed in detail and one can argue that it is here where the "seed of a
new law is planted" (NCOP Hansard, 20 April 1998: 344).
Co-operative governance consists of three basic elements. The first element is the
reduction of potential conflict amongst the three spheres of government. Competition
for resources and the contest for political playground make conflict amongst the three
spheres inevitable. The aim of co-operative governance is not to eliminate the
competition, but rather to ensure that it is manageable (Mayibuye, 1997: 15 also see
NCOP, Imperative of Local Government, 1998: 14).
Secondly, co-operative governance is about inter-sphere support. The interdependence
of spheres asks for inter-sphere assistance to ensure effective performance. This
means that the three spheres should assist one another in the carrying out of their
functions. Inter-sphere assistance again calls for the co-ordination of government
activities to eliminate wastage of resources that results from duplication (NCOP,
Provincial Comparative Study, 1998: 17)
Lastly, co-operative governance is about the provision of a framework to resolve
disputes. Mechanisms to ensure that disputes are settled in a constructive manner need
to be developed. In chapter three of the Constitution the NCOP is charged with the
important task of reviewing and mediating in the event of disputes between the
various spheres. The Mediation Committee as referred to in Section 76(d) of the
Constitution is an institutional mechanism that will avoid unnecessary legal
proceedings amongst the spheres of government. By creating this mechanism
litigation in the constitutional courts will by and large be minimised and local
government will be spared enormous legal costs (NCOP, NCOP in Review, 1998:
12).
This brings us to the institutional mechanism employed to give substance to co-
operative government - intergovernmental relations. The South African Constitution
assumes that intergovernmental relations are about procedural relations such as
structures and procedures. Indeed, intergovernmental relations are about the formal
and informal institutional mechanisms of activities between spheres of government to
utilise resources effectively and to avoid duplication and effort (NCOP Hansard, 17
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September 1997: 312). A structure called the Intergovernmental Foruml5 under the
auspices of the Department of Constitutional Affairs bring the three spheres of
government together to discuss and negotiate policy issues that directly affect the
relationship amongst them informally.
The constitution also makes prOVISIOnfor ten representatives of organised local
government to participate in the activities of the NCOP. These activities include
making contributions at committee level as well as participating in debates at a
plenary level. The local government representatives however do not have any voting
rights (Constitution RSA, 1996). On 30 March 1998 SALGA participated for the first
time in the proceedings of the NCOP. The reason for the delay in their participation
was due to the fact that legislation was not in place to guide their participation. The
Rules of the NCOP had to be amended accordingly (NCOP, Provincial Comparative
Study, 1998: 11).
At the first national workshop (8-9 May 1998) of the NCOP in Cape Town,
representatives of local government suggested to give organized local government
voting rights. This issue requires a wider debate, because local government and
provincial government emerge from different voting processes. Reservations were
expressed about the appropriateness of equating the voice of a more representative
structure such as a province with that of a more narrowly confined constituency like
local government. This would create obvious constitutional challenges like the
changing of the present electoral system (indirect representation) to a direct system of
representation (NCOP, Imperative of Co-operative Governance, 1998: 4).
3.3.3 Accountability of the executive
The Constitution also expects the NCOP to fulfil an oversight function (See
discussion in section 2.2 regarding the functioning of second chambers). In section 92
of the Constitution it is stated that the Executive is accountable to parliament. This
means that the executive is accountable to the NCOP and that the NCOP may require
a Minister, MEC or any national and provincial official to attend its hearings
(Intergovernmental Relations Audit, 1999: 120). An institutional system called
15 Forum of Premiers where they meet to discuss matters of interest among themselves and with Ministers at national level.
Meetings are called when it is deemed necessary more or less twice a year (Setai, 1994: 14).
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"question time" has been employed by the NCOP to call the executive to account. On
these days called "question days" (twice a quarter) Ministers are expected to answer
individual questions from members in the NCOP. These questions are focussed on
provincial concerns and prove to be a quite effective and active engagement of the
executive and the members. Members can submit questions for written as well as oral
reply to the ministries. In the case of oral reply members have the opportunity to ask
follow up questions related to the initial question (Office of the NCOP Chief Whip, 5
October 2000). In the past several instances occurred where ministers failed to tum up
for these special sessions. This created not only confusion and upset, but it also raised
the question on how the NCOP is viewed by the executive (NCOP Hansard, 18 May
1998).
3.3.4 Intervention powers of the NeOp
Section 139 of the Constitution provides that "when a municipality cannot or does not
fulfil an executive obligation in terms of legislation, the relevant provincial executive
may intervene by taking any appropriate steps to ensure fulfilment of that obligation"
(Constitution RSA, 1996). It further provides that these appropriate steps may include
the issuing of a directive describing the extent of the failure and stating the steps to be
taken to meet its obligations. This could be followed by the assumption of the
responsibilities of the municipality for the fulfilment of these obligations to ensure,
amongst others, that the established standards for the rendering of a service are met
(Constitution RSA, 1996). Section 139 requires the NCOP to review the intervention
regularly. This denotes that the intervention is not permanent and must cease upon
attainment of its objectives. The constitution states in Section 154 that:
"The national government and the provincial governments by legislative and other
measures, must support and strengthen the capacity of municipalities to manage their
own affairs, to exercise their powers and to perform their duties. "
In the addition to this section 155(6) states that each province must by legislative and
other measures:
(a) provide for the monitoring and support of local government in the province;
and
(b) promote the development of local government capacity to enable
municipalities to perform their functions and manage their own affairs.
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This give essence to inter-sphere support, as one of the elements of co-operative
governance. Provincial authorities see the use of section 139 as the exception to deal
with struggling municipalities. A provincial legislature member remarked in an audit
by the Department of Local Government and Provincial Affairs that: "They are very
well aware of the intrusive nature of an intervention" (Intergovernmental Relations
Audit, 1999: 90). Despite the challenges such as cost implications for provinces,
interventions are still regarded as the best way to deal with municipalities that fail to
perform their executive function (NCOP, Provincial Comparative Study, 1998: 9).
On 20 April 1998 the NCOP approved the intervention of the Eastern Cape Provincial
legislature in the municipality of Butterworth based on the fact that the municipality
failed to maintain essential national standards or meet established minimum standards
for the rendering of a service (Select Committee on Constitutional Affairs and Public
Administration, 20 April 1998). Butterworth was the first intervention and all the
other interventions that followed were modelled on the principles on which this
intervention was based.
3.3.4.1 Terms of interventlon'"
The Constitution states in Section 139 that the relevant provincial executive may
intervene in a municipality if that municipality cannot fulfil an executive function
(Constitution RSA, 1996). On 19 March 1998 the Eastern Cape Provincial
Government appointed two Administrators to take over the administration of the
Butterworth Transitional Local Council in terms of the provisions of Section 139 of
the Constitution. The Member ofthe Executive Council (MEC) for Local Government
and Housing in the Province, on behalf of the Eastern Cape Government, sought
approval for its intervention in Butterworth from the NCOP on 30 March 1998.
In terms of the provisions of Section 139(2)(c), the NCOP approved the intervention
in the Butterworth Transitional Local Council to the extent that it is necessary to
maintain essential national standards or meet established minimum standards for the
rendering of municipal services. The Administrators were empowered to assume
16 Based on the Report of the Select Committee on Constitutional Affairs and Public Administration, 31 March 1998
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executive and functional responsibility as envisaged m the Constitution, m the
following areas:
1. Provision of Services
The Administrators had to ensure that:
1.1 the water supply is restored and maintained
1.2 water purification standards are met
1.3 electricity supply is maintained
1.4 refuse removal services are rendered on a regular and sustainable basis
1.5 sewage removal services are rendered on a regular and sustainable basis
1.6 all other services not currently being performed in accordance with the said
minimum standards should be duly executed and that
1.7 the social, economic commercial and industrial viability of Butterworth is no
longer threatened
2. Financial Management
The Administrators should ensure that:
2.1 rates, fees, service charges and other monies due and owing to it are collected
2.2 the financial obligations are met
2.3 the municipality is placed in a position to comply with the provisions relating
to financial management as outlined in Section 10(G) of the Local
Government Transition Act (Act 209 of 1993).
3. Administrative procedures
The Administrators should ensure that standards for effective, efficient and
accountable administration are met and amongst others, that:
• policies and procedures for the use of the assets of the municipality are adhered to
• municipal services and assets are used solely for the purposes for which it was
intended and
• the affairs of the municipality are conducted in an open, transparent, accountable
and responsible manner
The powers of the Council were limited to the extent that the Administrators had
assumed the duties of the Municipality to maintain essential national standards or
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meet established minimum standards for the rendering of services. The Municipal
Council was allowed to have regular communication with the Administrators, subject
to the Management Regulations of the municipality. In terms of section 139(2)(d) of
the Constitution, the NCOP "must review the intervention regularly and must make
recommendations to the provincial executive with regards to the intervention"
(Constitution RSA, 1996). A NCOP delegation under the leadership of the then
Deputy Chairperson, Mr. B. Ngcuka visited the Butterworth community from 25 May
1998 to 26 May 1998. In their report they stated that the intervention should continue
subject to certain recommendations made by them (Report of Select Committee on
Constitutional Affairs, 1998: 2).
On 23 October 1998 the Municipality of Butterworth took the NCOP to court because
of the nature of the intervention approved by the Council. The Court resolved that the
present intervention must cease and that the Eastern Cape Provincial Government and
the Municipality of Butterworth should draw up a new intervention (Report of Select
Committee on Constitutional Affairs, 1998: 3). No application for a new intervention
was made to the NCOP. According to the Procedural Unit in the NCOP the matter
was resolved between the Provincial Government and the municipality without the
involvement of the NCOP. Table 4 gives a summary of the current intervention until
November 2000.
Table 4: Current Interventions as at November 200017
Town Province Date of Date of
Intervention Approval by
NCOP
1 Warrenton Northern 17 February 23 March 1999
Cape 1999
2 Ogies Northern Il May 1999 23 July 1999
Cape
3 Tweeling Free 19 July 23 August
State
4 Stilfontien North 3 August 1999 21 September
West 1999
5 Wedela North 3 August 1999 21 September
West 1999
6 Noupoort Northern 20 August 1999 21 September
Cape 1999
17 Procedural Unit in the NCOP October 2000. See also the Parliamentary ATC's on the mentioned dates.
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The reasons for all of these interventions were thus based on the constitutional
stipulation that a provincial executive may intervene into a municipality if that
municipality cannot fulfil an executive function. In all cases except for Tweeling,
where the councillors failed to meet, the financial situation led to the breakdown in
basic services, which then led to an intervention.
3.4 The NCOP and the national legislative process
In reality the NCOP consists of two distinct legislative processes, one for bills that
affect provinces (section 76 legislation) and another for those that do not (section 75
legislation). Before a government department tables a bill in Parliament, the State
Law Advisors determine what process the bill must follow (Joint Rules of Parliament,
2000: 34).
Once a bill has been tabled in Parliament, it must pass through what is referred to as
the "Joint Tagging Mechanism". This committee, made up of Presiding Officers of
each House of Parliament and the Legal Advisor to Parliament, then certifies the State
Law Advisor's classification of the bill e.g. 75 or 76 Bill. If there is a disagreement,
the bill is referred to the Constitutional Court for mediation (Joint Rules of
Parliament, 2000: 14). According to the Office of the Parliamentary Law Advisors, no
bill has ever been referred to the Constitutional Court for mediation (Interview:
Palmer, 10 December 1999).
3.4.1 Decision-making in the NCOP
Section 76 legislation, bills that are deemed to affect the provinces, requires provinces
to formally arrive at a mandate. Each province is allowed one vote, and the legislation
is passed with the support of at least five provinces. On the other hand Section 75
legislation, or so-called "national competency bills", are voted on individual or party
line votes (Joint Rules of Parliament, 2000: 14).
Bills that do not affect the provinces are those that relate to national functions (such as
Defence, Foreign Affairs and Justice). When the NA has passed such a bill, it goes to
the NCOP. Each delegate has one vote and can decide whether to vote in favour or
against the bill without consulting the province (Joint Rules of Parliament, 2000: 24).
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The process becomes considerably more complicated when a bill is deemed to
"affect" the provinces. Legislative issues that affect provinces are listed in Schedule 4
of the Constitution and include bills on issues such as Welfare, Education, Health,
Agriculture, etc., where national and provincial government have concurrent
competence. These bills require that each province cast only one vote, and five
provinces are needed to pass any bill (NCOP, Provincial Comparative Study, 1998:
13). Due to the fact that delegations vote according to the mandate of their provincial
legislature, the legislative process in the NCOP must allow for the provinces to
discuss the matter and formulate positions. At the same time provinces, through their
delegations, need an opportunity to discuss matters with each other (Murray 1998:
17).
To allow proper consultation and discussion both within provincial legislatures and
among provinces, the NCOP operates on a four-week cycle process (Murray 1998: 14
also see NCOP, Provincial Comparative Study 1998: 23).
A legislative cycle of the NCOP typically looks as follows.
• In the first week of the cycle the Department dealing with the legislation briefs
the committee on the legislation. It is also during this week that information is
disseminated to relevant stakeholders such as non-governmental organizations
and lobbying groups. Legislation and information are also sent to provincial
legislatures in order for them to start their own legislative processes.
• The second week is the so-called "province week". During this week
permanent delegates will return to their respective provinces to brief the
relevant committee of the provincial legislature on the legislation. The
committee then consider the piece of legislation in order for them to propose
amendments as well as to bring out a negotiating mandate on the Bill.
• In the third week of the cycle the permanent delegates return to Cape Town.
During this week the relevant select committee will meet again to discuss the
proposed amendments of their respective provinces. After the negotiations
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have taken place in the committee meeting, delegates will communicate the
final deliberations on the Bill to their provinces. The standing committee in
the provincial legislature will, after discussions, bring out a final mandate on
the Bill.
• In the fourth week (plenary week) the house would meet to consider the
legislation dealt with in the past three weeks. Provinces will at this occasion
bring out their votes on the respective pieces of legislation. The provincial
delegation will express their vote on behalf of the province. There is only one
vote per province. When five provinces agree on a piece of legislation it is
passed in the NCOP. The legislation is then referred to the NA.
The NA will consider the amendments made by the NCOP. If they agree on the
amendments the Bill is sent to the president for promulgation. If they do not agree the
following route is pursued.
3.4.2 Disputes between chambers
If the NA disagrees with the amendments made by the NCOP in the case of Section
76 legislation the Bill is referred to the Mediation Committee (Constitution RSA,
1996). The Mediation Committee consists of nine members of the NCOP and nine
members of the NA (Joint Rules of Parliament, 1998: 29). If the Mediation
Committee accepts:
• the NCOP version it goes back to the NA for consideration.
• the NA version it goes back to the NCOP for consideration.
If the Mediation Committee only agrees on its own version, the Bill is re-introduced
in Parliament. If however the Mediation Committee cannot agree on any version, the
Bill lapses (Constitution RSA Section 78,1996).
Section 75 legislation undergoes the same procedure as Section 76 legislation, except
that the various parties in the NA would bring out their party vote and not the
province as a multi-party institution. In the case where Section 75 legislation is
referred to the Mediation Committee and the Mediation Committee cannot agree on
any version the NA can revise it or pass the Bill with a two-thirds majority
(Constitution RSA, 1996).
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There was only one instance of disagreement on a piece of section 76 legislation. This
disagreement will however be used as an illustration of the process. On 16 March
1999 the Harmful Business Practices Amendment Bill [B 138B - 98] became the first
piece of legislation to be referred to a Mediation Committee. This committee were
comprised of nine members from the NA and nine members of the NCOP. The
Harmful Business Practices Amendment Bill [B 138B - 98] was passed by the NA on
6 November 1998 and submitted to the NCOP for approval. The NCOP passed the
Bill on 24 February 1999, with a number of amendments agreed to by the Select
Committee on Economic and Foreign Affairs.
Upon referral of the amended Bill to the NA, the house accepted the amendments to
the Bill passed by the NCOP, except an amendment to Clause 2(b) of the Bill. The
objection of the NA related to the inclusion of the words "in an open and transparent
manner" with which the Minister would have had to comply in appointing members
of the newly formed Consumer Affairs Committee. The bill was referred to the
Mediation Committee on 16 March 1999 in terms of Joint Rule 133(1)(b) of the Joint
Rules of Parliament, due to the fact that the NA rejected it. The Mediation
Committee met on 17 March 1999 and heard submissions from the chairpersons of
the relevant Portfolio Committee and Select Committee of the two Houses. Upon
further deliberation, it was unanimously decided that the words inserted by the
NCOP should be omitted. The Committee concurred that the Constitution adequately
imposes the obligation by the executive as intended by the NCOP. The Mediation
Committee therefore agreed to submit another version of the Bill (parliamentary
ATC, 23 March 1999).
Section 75 legislation can only be introduced in the NA. If the Bill is passed in the
NA it is referred to the NCOP for consideration. Here the delegates vote as
individuals and according to party lines. If the Bill is passed without amendments it
goes to the President for consent. If the bill was amended by the council it is referred
back to the NA. In the case where the NA disagrees with the amendments made by
the NCOP, they can ignore those amendments and pass the Bill without the NCOP
agreeing to it (Constitution RSA, 1996).
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3.4.3 The committee system
There are nine select committees in the NCOP. These committees consist of a
minimum of nine members to ensure that each province is represented in a committee.
All nine provinces are represented in the committees. Parties are represented
proportionally in the committees (NCOP Rules, 2000: 12).
Select committees in the NCOP are clustered. This means that they process legislation
of more than one government department. According to the rules of the NCOP, Select
Committees are established "to deal with legislation, oversight and other matters
concerning the affairs of government" (NCOP Rules, 2000: 14). Since the NCOP
guard over matters of provincial concern, it can be argued that these committees are
established to scrutinise legislation and the workings of government from a provincial
perspective. The Portfolio Committees in the NA as the name indicates, are attached
to one specific Minister's portfolio. One would thus have a Portfolio Committee on
Justice and a Portfolio Committee on Constitutional Affairs in the NA. In the NCOP
these two portfolios would be clustered as one namely, the Select Committee on
Constitutional Affairs and Justice. As indicated in table four, all of the NCOP Select
Committee Chairpersons always have been ANC members (See table 5).
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Table 5: Select Committees and Chairpersons since 199618
Clustering of Chairpersons Clustering of Chairpersons
Committees 1996-1999 Committees 1999-2004
1996-1999 1999-2004
Constitutional Affairs and Public M. Bhabha ~ Security and J.L. Mahlangu ~
Administration: Constitutional and ANC Constitutional Affairs ANC
Provincial Affairs and Local
Government
Education, Arts, Culture, Science, I.W. Direko Party: Education and D. Kgware ~:
Technology, Sport and Recreation ANC Recreation ANC
Social Services: Health, Home Dr S.C. ~ Social Services L. Jacobus ~
Affairs, Welfare and Population Cwele ANC ANC
Development
Environmental Affairs, Land R.Z. ~ Agriculture and Land Rev P. ~:
Affairs, Tourism, Agriculture, Nogumla ANC Affairs Moatshe ANC
Water Affairs and Forestry
Public Services: Housing, Public J.L. Kgoali- ~ Public Services P.C.P. ~
Works and Transport 1996-1998 ANC Majodina ANC
N.E. Lamani
1998-1999
Economic Affairs: Trade and HJ.P Lebona ~ Economic and Foreign M.V. Moosa ~:
Industry, Foreign Affairs and ANC Affairs ANC
Mineral and Energy Affairs
Security and Justice: Defence, M. V. Moosa Party: Security and J.L. Mahlangu ~
Correctional Services, Safety and ANC Constitutional Affairs ANC
Security, Intelligence and Justice
Finance S.L.E. ~ Finance Q.D. ~
Fenyane ANC Mahlangu ANC
Labour, Public Enterprises, Posts, J.A. Foster Party: Labour and Public S.L.E. Party:
Telecommunications and 1996-1998 ANC Enterprises Fenyane ANC
Broadcasting. 1. Mutsila ~
1998-1999
The Chairperson of each committee is selected out of the committee members by the
members themselves at the first committee meeting of the committee (NCOP Rules,
2000: 20). Besides the select committees, ad hoc committees can also be established
to deal with issues of urgency, like the ad hoc committee on the termination of
pregnancies. Due to the wide spread public interest in this matter a special committee
18 Information obtained from the Office of the Chief Whip in the NCOP, October 2000
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was established in 1996 to deal with this controversial piece of legislation
(Parliamentary Public Education Department, 1999:4 also see Joint Rules of
Parliament, 2000: 27).
Committees in the NCOP process legislation coming from the various departments.
For example, the Committee on Constitutional Affairs and Public Administration will
deliberate on pieces of legislation that originated within the respective departments.
Committees may also organise public hearings'" on legislation or policy frameworks,
if they deem it necessary. The committee can thus decide whether or not to have
public hearings. This normally depends on the nature of the legislation. At these
hearings the public, sectoral and other relevant stakeholders are invited to make
submissions on the legislation on hand (Joint Rules of Parliament, 2000: 26 see also
Parliamentary Pub 1icEducation Department, 1997: 7).
3.5 Information flow
The success or effectiveness of the NCOP relies heavily on its ability to efficiently
communicate with its members, partners in the provinces and SALGA. This is not an
easy task considering that no single form of communication can be used to reach each
and every individual (NCOP, Provincial Comparative Study, 1999: 25).
The NCOP Liaison Unit at Parliament has the primary responsibility of relaying
information to the provinces and local government. This information is
simultaneously sent to both Regis House offices'", and to the provinces themselves
(NCOP, NCOP Review, 1998: 28).
The quickest, and most accurate form of communication - electronic mail - is used by
eight of the nine provinces. Eastern Cape is the only province that is not electronically
linked to the NCOP liaison unit due to technical problems (NCOP Liaison Unit, 27
September 2000). Often the software packages are not compatible with those in use at
Parliament. Communicating by fax is often not desirable since long legislative
documents or minutes from meetings can consume reams of paper, and tie up phone
19 See The Policy - making on a health issue: traditional healing in South Africa by N. Mavunghu, 1998 for a full discussion on
public hearings.
20 Provincial liaison officers based in Cape Town, also see discussion in section 3.5.1.
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lines and staff for hours. Additionally, the typeface may not be legible by the time it
reaches its destination, as it will often be a third or fourth generation copy. Courier
services that convey information from the NCOP to the provinces have also proven to
be problematic, given the time constraints that provinces work under to deliver a
mandate on time and the fact that the courier services operate only twice weekly
(Interview: May, 13 March 1998). The result is that there is no uniform way in which
information is transferred to the provinces and local government. Information is often
duplicated, resulting in a time consuming and often confusing pattern. This confusion
is exacerbated by a lack of understanding of the NCOP processes and procedures by
provincial partners (Interview: Willemse, 23 March 1998).
3.5.1 Regis House
In July 2000 eight out of the nine provinces had NCOP liaison staff in Cape Town at
Regis House.21 These liaison officers are employees of the provincial legislatures, and
their individual roles in the NCOP processes vary greatly based on the needs and
structures of the provinces they serve (NCOP Liaison Unit, 22 October 2000). When
originally created, the so-called Regis House offices were envisioned as being the
focal point of provincial NCOP activity in Cape Town. Each province was allocated
office space, basic office equipment, furniture and computers. Provinces were
responsible for the hiring and salary of staff for these offices. The liaison officers liase
with their respective provinces on a daily basis via electronic mail and telephone
(NCOP, Provincial Comparative Study, 1998: 24).
Table 6 is showing exactly what information is conveyed as well as the way in which
it is transferred in the NCOP.
21 The Western Cape is the only province that does not have a Regis House office, due to their close proximity to the NCOP and
a provincial hiring freeze that prevented the legislature from filling the position (NCOP Provincial Comparative Study, 1998:
24).
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Table 6: Information flow in the NCOP
NCOP Adlministration
..
National Assembly ... Information Technology Department
L.____--------l~1_S;:
Legislation and Procedmes
Ir "
I
Committee Chairperson
I
Committee Clerk
.----------- ~
I NeOpAdministation II
NeOp Help Desk
I
1 1
Provinces .._....
When the NA refers legislation to the NeOp it is first sent to the NeOp
administrations, consisting of the Information Technology Department and the
Legislation and Procedures section. From the latter it is then referred to the committee
chairperson and committee clerk. The committee clerk submits status reports to the
NeOp administration and the NeOp Help Desk, continuously while the committee is
processing the relevant piece of legislation. Both these sections send off the
information to the provinces.
66
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
3.5.2 Information sources within the NCOP
According to the NCOP Liaison Unit (22 October 2000) there are basically seven
sources that deal with the official flow of information within and outside of the
NCOP. Table 7 shows exactly what information is conveyed as well as the way in
which it is transferred.
Table 7: Official NCOP Sources - Schematic Outline
Source/origin Item Mode of communication
I.Liaison Office Programme Faxed to province
Internal Mail to Regis House
Fax
-------------------------------- --------------------------------
Bills passed by NA Fax
(In consultation with table assistant Courier; internal mail
-------------------------------- --------------------------------
Back-up daily papers Fax; internal mail
-------- ......---------------------- --------------------------------
Back-up documentation of E-mail/fax
rules/whips meetings --------------------------------
---_ ... _-_ .._---------------------- Fax and internal mail to Regis House
Draft resolutions and order papers --------------------------------
-------_ ... _ .....__ ....._-----_ .._------- Fax; internal mail
Amendments to bills (emergencies)
-------------------------------- -----------_ ........... _-_ ......... ---------
Requests for special delegates Fax; internal mail
-------------------------------- --------------------------------
Staff issues: agendas; minutes of
meetings and workshops; staff Fax; internal mail
contact info. Etc.
----------------------------_ ..._-
Documentation re SALGA: cont. --------------------------------
Info, govt. gazettes, etc. Fax; internal mail
2.Table assistants Agendas and minutes of rules, joint Fax; internal mail
rules and rules of sub-committees
---- ... __ .......... --------------------- --------------------------------
Letters to speakers re bills passed by Fax; courier
NA
3.Committees Committee documentation Fax; courier
4.Legislation and proceedings Status of legislation Courier; internal mail to Regis House
5.Hansard stores Daily papers, hansard departmental Courier; internal mail to Regis house
annual reports
6.Data section Daily papers E-mail
3.6 Conclusion
This chapter shows that the NCOP is a unique body created to facilitate provincial and
local government participation in the national legislative process. The NCOP is a
concrete expression of the principle of "co-operative governance" as set out in chapter
three of the Constitution. The NCOP is a functioning partnership among the three
spheres of government. The underpinning rationale of the NCOP is to ensure that
national policy is sensitive to provincial needs and concerns. It also requires that
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provinces do not act alone or in isolation. The NCOP institutionalises the principle of
co-operative government by involving the nine provinces directly in the national
legislative process. The process of building consensus among provincial delegations
requires a great deal of consultation and communication. This communication ensures
that each province is fully informed of the content of the legislation and able to
consult public stakeholders and come up with a mandate in time. The result is an
extremely complicated legislative process. This consultation demands an immense
amount of co-ordination and synchronisation to ensure the successful running of the
NCOP. The absence of effective communication systems would eventually result in
the failure of the institution.
In the following and last chapter possible recommendations are considered to
contribute in the better functioning of the institution.
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Chapter 4
Conclusion
4.1 Introduction
The NCOP is still a fairly new institution. As it is often said about this institution, "It
is still work in progress" (Murray 1998: 2). Like all of South Africa's new democratic
institutions the NCOP is also confronted with many challenges. In conclusion the
study focus will be shifted to the various challenges that face this institution.
First, it has no direct precedent, in South Africa or in the world. It is a brand new
institution. While it is modelled in some respects after the German "Bundesrat" it
differs in important ways (See discussion in section 3.1).
Second, it is a legislature that bridges the spheres of government. Rooted in the
provinces, by virtue of its purpose, membership and voting rules, it is also a part of
the national legislature (See discussion in section 3.3.2). In this sense, it necessarily
faces two directions, and the pressures arising from each may sometimes be in
tension. As a bridge, communication must flow two ways: from the NCOP to the
provinces, as it keeps provinces abreast of developments in the national legislative
process; and from the provinces to the NCOP, as they communicate their voting
mandates to the delegation in Cape Town (See discussion in section 3.6). This double
aspect of the NCOP places enormous demands on communications systems, on the
permanent and special delegates, and on their staffs.
Third, the requirement to develop and communicate mandates to their delegations
means that provincial legislatures have become part of the national legislative system.
They must be prepared to inform themselves about national legislation, consult their
provincial electorate about it, and decide upon it - all in addition to carrying out their
responsibilities of legislation and oversight on purely provincial matters. This is no
easy task, given the distances involved, the background and preparation of members,
their understanding of their role, and their resources (See discussion in section 3.5.1).
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Fourth, the relationship between the NeOp and the NA might be described as
'legislative intergovernmental relations'. This exists in parallel with another critical
set of intergovernmental relations, at the executive level (See discussion in section
3.3.1). Integrating these two is a major challenge, with important implications for the
development of legislative-executive relations in both spheres.
Facing up to these challenges are not easy. Following is a list of recommendations to
improve the technical requirements for the functioning of the NeOp.
4.2 Recommendations
• Composition
In an audit conducted by the Department of Local Government and Provincial
Affairs it was found that permanent delegates do not function optimally as they
lack the capacity and resources to interrogate the practical and policy implications
of bills. According to an MP: "The Neop is a place of patronage. The problem
with the institution is that it is a repository for political parties. The result is that
members don't actively participate in the NeOP" (Department of Local
Government and Provincial Affairs, 1999: 128). This can be explained by the fact
that permanent delegates are only appointed to the NeOp after an election. This
uncertainty makes politicians aim for the NA or provincial legislatures (where the
lists are drawn up before the elections) in the first instance.
The view is also held that special delegates do not add value to the NeOp. They
hardly participate in the committees of the NeOp. A possibility that exists in this
regard is to increase the delegates and make them all permanent delegates.
Frustrations are expressed regarding the workload of permanent delegates on the
one hand.22 On the other hand special delegates hardly have the time to do
committee work in the NeOp (Department of Local Government and Provincial
Affairs, 1999: 133). This increased number of delegates should also accommodate
SALGA (Department of Local Government and Provincial Affairs, 1999:129).
The composition of the NeOp could also become more provincial orientated if a
new election system is considered.
22 Due to the clustering of portfolios in the NeOp members end up serving eight different portfolios. This lead to various
problems like the attendance of meetings and public hearings as well as how to keep abreast of developments in all of these fields
at the same time.
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Currently the NCOP is dependent on provincial results for its composition
although each province has an equal number of delegates notwithstanding
variations in population density. Provincial legislatures are based on a single
proportional representation list system. This means that there is no particular
regard to regional interests within provinces. Proportional representation in
provincial legislatures is constitutional required by the South African Constitution
(Section 105 (d)).
A possible system that could be considered is the Additional Member System
(AMS). This is a hybrid of the First-Past- The-Post (FPTP) and the List system.
With AMS, electors have two votes each (Pomper, 1988: 34). They cast a FPTP
vote for single candidate in the single constituencies. They also vote for the party
list of their choice by placing a cross next to its name. When the constituency
votes are counted the proportion of the seats won is compared with the proportion
of the party votes casts. List seats are allocated to parties from the top of the list
until there is as much of a match between the two proportions as possible. This
would make provincial representatives directly accountable to the people and the
province it serves. This could be a way in ensuring that the interest of the
provinces are better served in the national legislative process.
• Constitutional Powers of the NCOP
A general view that is held is that the first NCOP (1997-1999) had not carried out
its oversight function as competently as it was required to do. It is perceived that
the NCOP Select Committees have been less active than their counter parts in the
NA (Department of Local Government and Provincial Affairs, 1999: 124). A
reason for this may be the lack of capacity. It is therefore recommended that the
NCOP should give closer attention to the budget process and it should focus more
on local government and its relationship to the provinces.
• Oversight and role of executive
In the past there was situations where Ministers did not turn up for question time
allocated to them by the NCOP (The Star, 19 May 1998). During these sessions
questions are put to Ministers to be answered orally. It created not only just anger
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with the then Chairperson of the NCOP, Mr. Lekota (Cape Times, 19 May 1998)
but it also raised the question on how serious the Executive perceives the NCOP
to be. It seemed that the Executive argues that the question time in the NCOP is a
duplication of question time in the NA. Sometimes the same questions are asked
in both houses. To avoid this problem it is recommended that questions in the
NCOP should be limited to issues of provincial concern.
The VIew that the first NCOP (1997-1999) had not carried out its oversight
function, as it is required to do is expressed in an Audit by the Department of
Provincial and Local Government Affairs (Department of Provincial and Local
Government Affairs, 1999:120). They go further to say that part of the reason for
this that there are too few permanent delegates with too many committee meetings
to attend. To face the challenge of the lack of person power it is suggested that the
NCOP must focus more on the budget process as well as the relationship between
local government and the provinces. This would prevent a situation where the
NCOP would get involved in a range of activities that are beyond the realm of
focused provincial interests.
• Future role of the NeOp in the legislative process
Before the inception of the NCOP it was feared that the second house would
merely become a rubber stamp for the NA. Up until now the fear has not been
proved unjustified, because the NCOP's vote never differed from that of the NA
so far. The NCOP are making amendments to bills, but never in its short history
did it reject the version of the NA in its totality. The general view amongst the
national executive is that the NCOP adds little value to the legislative process and
that its legislative contributions have not been substantial (Department of Local
Government and Provincial Affairs, 1999: 115). If provinces in the NCOP are
voting according to party lines and not according to provincial interest the purpose
of the NCOP is defeated. It is thus recommended that a more objective approach
toward party lines be used when Bills concerning provinces are considered. This
could be facilitated through the employment of a new electoral system or to give
more political power to provincial governments.
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• Information flow
Provinces liase with the NCOP through different mechanisms. This sometimes
results in confusion and duplication. For instance mandates will be faxed either to
the Chief-Whip's office, Regis House, NCOP Liaison Office or the Office of the
Chairperson of the relevant Select Committee. There is presently no standard
mechanism in place to facilitate this area effectively. It is recommended that the
existing roles and responsibilities in this field be re-assigned to offices, informed
by the practical experiences of the past. A standard communication system based
on sophisticated technological means needs to be developed in order for the
institution to operate effectively. Members serving in this institution must also
receive the necessary training in these communications systems.
• Regis House
This liaison centre perceived to be under utilised. According to the schematic
outline of functions performed by the various information sources in the NCOP
duplication of roles can be detected between the NCOP liaison office and Regis
House. It is suggested that clear roles and responsibilities for this office should be
re-allocated. This would require wide consultations with all the stakeholders
involved, especially provinces, not just because they employ staff but it would
have a direct effect on its liaison with the NCOP.
4.3 Concluding remarks
As described above, the NCOP is a umque institution with no precedent. lts
successful operation requires careful co-ordination with nine provincial legislatures
and the NA. Many challenges have been identified, some are political and require new
political commitment and a change of mindset, other relate to infrastructure and
physical resources. Some of the challenges and recommendations identified are small,
requiring only minor changes to present practices, others are larger and to address
them requires a substantial financial or organisational commitment. The larger
question that however, remains is whether and how the NCOP will be able to implant
itself fully into the national legislative system, as the Constitution envisages. This is a
political question that cannot be fully answered.
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